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FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES
THOMAS D. RUSSELL*
ABSTRACT
This Article is about civil procedure, torts, insurance, litigation, and professional
ethics. The Article is the opening article in a conversation with Stanford Law Professor
Nora Freeman Engstrom, who has written about the plaintiffs’ bar and settlement mill
attorneys.
The empirical center of this piece examines 356 answers to 298 car crash personal
injury cases in Colorado’s district courts. The Article situates these cases within
dispute pyramid elements including the total number of miles-traveled within
Colorado and the volume of civil litigation.
The Article then analyzes the defense attorneys’ departures from the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure, especially Rule 8. In particular, I count and analyze lawyers’
claims that they need not answer because an allegation calls for a legal conclusion; is
directed at a co-defendant; or that a statute or document "speaks for itself."
The Article also generally discusses the failure to investigate claims before
answering, which, in my opinion, violates Rule 11 and the Code of Professional
Conduct.
Last, the title derives from the final empirical section, which examines the pleading
of laundry lists of so-called “affirmative defenses.” The Article shows that on average,
each defense attorney includes nine items within a list of defenses. Few are true
affirmative defenses. For 90 percent of the lists of defenses, there is no factual support
whatsoever. On average, insurance defense attorneys plead 0.14 facts in support of
each list of affirmative defenses.
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from my days at The University of Texas at Austin, provided authoritative advice when I called
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I. INTRODUCTION

Sometime after the first-year civil procedure course, insurance defense lawyers
learn to ignore the rules of civil procedure when filing answers to lawsuits. First-year
law students in the United States study the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Their
professors teach that for each allegation in plaintiffs’ complaints, the Rules require
defendants to answer by admitting, denying, or stating that they do not have sufficient
information to form a belief about the allegation, which Rule 8 then deems denied.2
Most states have patterned their rules of civil procedure after the Federal Rules—
including Colorado, which is the subject of this study.3 In most state courts, then,

1 FED. R. CIV. P.
2 JOSEPH W. GLANNON ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A COURSEBOOK 23 (3d ed. 2017); GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 590–91 (11th ed.
2015); BROOKE D. COLEMAN ET AL., LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 310–14 (3d ed. 2018);
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL & JOANNA C. SCHWARTZ, CIVIL PROCEDURE 427 (10th ed. 2018); GENE R.
SHREVE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 8.08 (6th ed. 2019); RICHARD D. FREER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.3.4 (4th ed. 2017); HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE 118–
19 (3d ed. 2018); THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL § 5.5, at 160 (9th ed. 2015).
3 For a survey of each jurisdiction accompanying Colorado in the extent to which they reflect a
similarity to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The
Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH.
L. REV. 1367, 1370 & n.21 (1986), which found that twenty-two states (along with the District
of Columbia) replicate the Federal Rules and that ten others are similar but lack at least one of
the strict requirements necessary to be considered a replica. However, the most recent trend is
away from conformity with the federal rules. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal
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defense lawyers are to admit, deny, or say that they have insufficient information or
knowledge to form a belief.4 Defense lawyers can also admit part of an allegation
while denying the remainder.5 After answering plaintiffs’ allegations, lawyers for
defendants may append affirmative defenses that purport to defeat the plaintiffs’ entire
claims.6
This Article presents original empirical data concerning the legal system in action.
I first describe the broader context of automobile travel, crashes, and litigation that
sociolegal scholars refer to as the “dispute pyramid,” although I suggest that a salmon
run might be a more apt metaphor for the difficulty navigating from car crash through
claims and litigation toward compensation.7 I examine the total number of miles
traveled, the number of crashes, and the number of crashes causing injuries.8 People
generally think there is too much litigation, a claim that means nothing without actual
data as to how many suits could exist relative to how many actually do exist.9 These
data about injury and litigation rates are not central to my argument, but given the
paucity of data concerning the actual operation of the legal system, I felt some
obligation to collect and present these data.
Next, I establish the proportion of all personal injury litigation that is car crash
lawsuits.10 The single-event tort world—as opposed to mass torts or class actions—is
really about car crashes and not about slip-and-falls, dog bites, train injuries, and,
especially, not about medical malpractice.
After situating automobile travel, crashes, injuries, and litigation within broader
empirical contexts, I get down to the business of analyzing the answers themselves.11
This study examines answers that insurance defense lawyers filed in automobile car

Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 383 (2003) (“Even among states that fifteen years ago
could be counted as substantially conforming to the federal model of procedure, recent
significant amendments have been more frequently rejected or ignored than adopted.”).
4 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b) (“A party shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim
asserted and shall admit or deny the averments of the adverse party. If he is without knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this
has the effect of a denial.” (emphasis added)).
5 Id. (“When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an averment,
he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder.”).
6 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
7 See infra Part II.
8 See infra Part II.
9 See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1095
(1996) (explaining the commonly held view about tort claims that “Americans sue too readily,
‘at the drop of a hat;’ egged on by avaricious lawyers, they overwhelm our congested courts
with mounting numbers of suits, including many frivolous claims”); Thomas D. Russell, Blood
on the Tracks: Turn-of-the-Century Streetcar Injuries, Claims, and Litigation in Alameda
County, California (Oct. 23, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
10 See infra Part II.
11 See infra Part III.
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crash cases in Colorado. I analyze 356 answers. The first part of an answer consists of
the defense attorney’s responses to the plaintiff’s allegations. The first part of my
analysis catalogs defense departures from the Rules when responding to the
allegations of complaints.12 This part of the analysis is empirical but only lightly
quantitative.
After admitting or denying allegations, lawyers for defendants have an opportunity
to include affirmative defenses in sections of answers usually titled “Affirmative
Defenses” or simply “Defenses.” My method is very simple and easily reproduced: I
count the total number of defenses and then I count the defenses that the insurance
defense lawyers have supported with at least one fact.13
This Article shows that the insurance defense attorneys generally engage in
routinized practices; conduct little to no pre-answer factual investigation themselves
and ignore any factual investigation that claims agents have already conducted; ignore
the rules of civil procedure; take purposive, obstructive actions that defeat the factfinding goals of pleading; likely delegate legal work to paralegals; and, in my opinion,
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.14
Criticizing lawyers, judges, and the legal system is a responsibility of law
professors.15 For law professors, law reviews are like letters to the editor except longer
and with lots of footnotes.16 In this Article, I communicate my professional opinions17
on matters of public interest and general concern18 including the behavior of some
12 See infra Part III.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1538–
39 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice] (describing anecdotal evidence that
settlement mills sacrifice client recoveries for speed and efficiency); see also Nora Freeman
Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 841 (2011) [hereinafter
Engstrom, Sunlight] (“[S]ome settlement mills . . . have non-attorneys negotiate settlements of
third-party personal injury claims in apparent violation of Model Rule of Professional Conduct
5.5.”).
15 Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 158,
166 (2001) (“Law professors have unique opportunities and corresponding obligations. Time
and tenure give us the luxury of directing our attention to matters that matter to us. But with that
privilege comes a responsibility to focus at least some of our efforts on what also matters to the
public—on how well law and lawyers are serving its interests.”).
16 Burns v. McGraw-Hill Broad. Co., 659 P.2d 1351, 1360 (Colo. 1983) (“Allegedly
defamatory language must be examined in the context in which it is uttered.”).
17 Because the opinions in this Article are mine as a law professor, they are not the opinions of
any other person or entity including the student editors of this journal; the Cleveland State Law
Review; Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Cleveland State University; nor, least of all, the
University of Denver.
18 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (requiring plaintiffs in
defamation actions to prove falsity and fault in matters of public interest and general concern);
Diversified Mgmt., Inc. v. Denver Post, Inc., 653 P.2d 1103, 1110 (Colo. 1982) (“We now
believe that the robust debate on public issues that we were seeking to protect in Walker is better
protected by using the St. Amant definition of ‘reckless disregard’ in cases involving matters of
public or general concern, as well as in cases involving public officials and public figures.”);
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insurance defense attorneys in car-crash litigation, deviations from the rules of civil
procedure by some defense attorneys, departures by some insurance defense lawyers
from the legal profession’s ethical rules, and the complicity of some members of the
plaintiffs’ bar and bench in allowing these declines of legal professionalism. These
matters are of general concern because how our courts adjudicate civil actions
involving car crashes, insurance, tort law, and other litigation are important to the
public interest. Systematic, rigorous investigation of publicly filed answers and
complaints supports my factual analysis and opinions, as do academic freedom,
tenure, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.19 I welcome
competing argument.20 Within the Article, the fair report or fair presentation privilege
protects my recounting of the claims plaintiffs make in their public complaints and of
the defenses that defendants offer in return, even though the lawsuits are, at that point,
unresolved.21 As for the lawyers, my expert legal opinion as an academic who
practices law is that lawyers who present arguments in publicly filed pleadings,
motions, and other documents consent to their use by scholars in precisely the same

id. at 1106 (“[F]irst amendment values would be better honored by adopting the same definition
of ‘reckless disregard’ in cases involving public officials, public figures, and matters of public
or general concern.”); COLO. COMM. ON PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTION 22:3 (Reckless Disregard Defined—Where the Plaintiff Is a Public Official or
Public Person or, If a Private Person, the Statement Pertained to a Matter of Public Interest or
General Concern) (“A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the time of
publication, the person publishing it believes that the statement is probably false or has serious
doubts as to its truth.”).
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press . . . .”); see also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“[E]very person shall be free to speak,
write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty;
and in all suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the
jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact.”); OHIO CONST. art.
I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty
of speech, or of the press.”).
20 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.”).
21 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.05 (West 2020); Tonnessen v. Denver Pub. Co., 5 P.3d 959,
964 (Colo. App. 2000) (“[U]nder the common law doctrine of fair report, reports of in-court
proceedings containing defamatory material are privileged if they are fair and substantially
correct, or are substantially accurate accounts of what took place.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 611 (AM. L. INST. 1977) (“The publication of defamatory matter concerning another
in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with
a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair
abridgement of the occurrence reported.”); see also Catalanello v. Kramer, 18 F. Supp. 3d 504,
509 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (granting a law professor’s motion to dismiss a defamation complaint after
the professor “accepted an offer from the Washington University Law Review to publish the
article and, during that same month, posted the article to the Social Science Research Network
(SSRN), an online repository of academic research”); Zachary A. Kramer, Of Meat and
Manhood, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 287 (2011).
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way that advocates who argue before the United States Supreme Court agree to engage
not just the Justices but the entire world—including law professors—in argument.22
Another aim of this study is to begin to engage the work of Stanford Law School’s
Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom.23 Professor Engstrom has written a series of
fascinating articles about what she and others call “settlement mills.”24 Settlement
mills are law firms that represent personal injury claimants.25 The lawyers in Professor
Engstrom’s settlement mills never, or at most rarely, file lawsuits.26 Instead, they
churn their clients’ smallish claims and achieve even smaller settlements with
insurance companies.27 Professor Engstrom interviewed many settlement-mill lawyers
and combined her qualitative research with other scholars’ quantitative research.28 The
settlement-mill lawyers’ efforts fascinate Professor Engstrom even as their means of
achieving settlement at times appears to horrify the Stanford professor.29 I read part of
22 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (“In preserving that form of government
the First and Fourteenth Amendments command nothing less than that the States may not
impose sanctions on the publication of truthful information contained in official court
records open to public inspection.”); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344 (“An individual who
decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary consequences of that
involvement in public affairs.”).
23 Nora Freeman Engstrom, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.stanford.edu/directory/nora-freemanengstrom/ [https://perma.cc/NQR6-XQZT] (describing Professor Engstrom’s work as a
nationally recognized expert in both tort law and legal ethics, her written work on various
subjects including settlement mills, and her memberships in the American Law Institute and
World Tort Law Society).
24 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14; Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14; Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Legal Access and Attorney Advertising, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y
& LAW 1083 (2011) [hereinafter Engstrom, Legal Access]; Nora Freeman Engstrom, Shining a
Light on Shady Personal Injury Claims, 2 J. INS. FRAUD AM. 13 (2011).
25 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1486 (“[H]igh-volume personal injury
law practices that aggressively advertise and mass produce the resolution of claims . . . .”);
Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 807 (defining settlement mills as personal injury firms
that advertise aggressively, settle a high volume of low-stakes claims, engage in little attorneyclient interaction, and rarely take claims to trial).
26 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487–88 (describing “conventional”
personal injury lawyers as those who litigate cases and appear in court and settlement-mill
attorneys as those who have a larger client base, aggressively advertise, contract a higher
percentage of those who call as potential clients, delegate more tasks to non-attorneys, file fewer
lawsuits, and take even fewer or no cases to trial).
27 Id. at 1535–42.
28 See, e.g., id. at 1527–28 (providing a quote from a Garnett & Associates attorney saying that
“the smaller cases are better off settled” to show that the average amount paid by a tort defendant
compared to settlement mills’ average gross recovery (adjusted for inflation) incentivizes a
preference among both plaintiffs and defendants to settle).
29 See, e.g., id. at 1505 (explaining how Sledge, a.k.a. “the hammer,” would use his office
manager to negotiate and settle with insurance adjusters, and then evaluate her performance
based on the number of files settled and amount of money collected).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6

6

2021]

FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES

791

her message as being “Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Settlement-Mill
Personal Injury Lawyers.”30
My remix: “Don’t Let Your Law Students Grow Up to Be Insurance Defense Mill
Lawyers.” In her research, Professor Engstrom conducted confidential telephone
interviews with personal injury lawyers who had worked in settlement mills.31 In
contrast, this Article looks at the filed, public work of lawyers who defend personal
injury lawsuits on behalf of insurance companies.32 Adapting Professor Engstrom’s
nomenclature, I refer to these lawyers—working on the other side of the industry from
the lawyers whom Professor Engstrom interviewed and studied—as insurance defense
mill lawyers.33 My conclusions parallel those of Professor Engstrom.
Insurance defense mill lawyers do not work directly opposite Professor
Engstrom’s settlement-mill lawyers. Rather, they work on the opposite side of the
versus in the lawsuit’s caption—the insurance and defense side. However, the defense
lawyers are one step further along in the litigation process than their plaintiff-side
counterparts. Insurance defense mill lawyers answer complaints, which by Professor
Engstrom’s definition, the settlement-mill lawyers almost never file.34 The lawyers
who actually file complaints—as opposed to settle cases without filing—Professor
Engstrom calls “conventional” lawyers.35 Insurance defense mill lawyers answer the
complaints of these conventional lawyers.
A generation ago, Kent Syverud, then a Michigan and Vanderbilt law professor
and now chancellor of Syracuse University, made the point that personal injury
lawyers and liability insurers live symbiotically. “The insurance industry and the trial
lawyers may take potshots at each other in attempts to reform aspects of the

30 See ED BRUCE, Mammas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Cowboys, on ED BRUCE
(United Artists Records 1975); see also WAYLON JENNINGS & WILLIE NELSON, Mammas Don’t
Let Your Babies Grow up to Be Cowboys, on WAYLON AND WILLIE (RCA Records 1978).
31 See, e.g., Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 819 & nn.51–57 (maintaining the anonymity
of settlement-mill attorneys who prioritized speed and settlements and referred cases to other
firms when a suit proceeded to litigation). Professor Engstrom’s prodigious research also
included the review of thousands—maybe tens of thousands—of pages of documentary
evidence including records of disciplinary proceedings and attorney malpractice
actions. Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1488 n.13.
32 The data are from lawsuits filed during the first six months of 2015. The complaints, answers,
and most of the filings in each case are open, public records. They are available for a fee through
Colorado Courts E-Filing, the entity that handles electronic filing in Colorado, or they are
available for free (though only as printed documents) through the Colorado Supreme Court,
which is where my research assistant and I collected them. See infra Part III.
33 Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 855 (describing how settlement-mill lawyers rarely
file lawsuits and, as a result, rarely interact with insurance defense attorneys or judges).
34 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1502–03 (describing the difference
between the settlement mills she researched that file suit at rates between 5% and 15% and their
conventional counterparts, which file suit approximately 50% of the time).
35 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487–88.
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relationship,” Syverud explained, “but they cannot afford to shoot to kill.”36 Syverud
understands that, like the relationships between clownfish and sea anemones and
between African oxpeckers and giraffes, plaintiffs’ lawyers and the insurance industry
rely upon each other.37 Perhaps symbiosis is not a sufficient description, as plaintiffs’
lawyers do not merely sustain liability insurers as if chasing away butterfly fish and
flies: plaintiffs’ lawyers expand the demand for liability insurance.38 The reverse is
also true. Liability insurers supply plaintiffs and their lawyers with the money that
keeps the plaintiffs’ bar in business.39
Although the insight about symbiosis is not fresh, empirical scholars, including
Professor Engstrom, have focused their gaze mostly on the plaintiff side of the
relationship. Few empirical scholars have looked into the defense side of the
mutualistic relationship.40 When referring to the work of the claims agents—the
insurance industry employees who work opposite the settlement mills—scholars tend
to rely on the excellent though somewhat stale insights that H. Laurence Ross first
articulated in his 1970 book Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance
Claims Adjustment.41 Professor Ross, of what was then SUNY Buffalo but is now the
36 Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1990).
37 See Daphne Gail Fautin, The Anemonefish Symbiosis: What Is Known and What Is Not, 10
SYMBIOSIS 23, 38–40 (1991) (explaining how anemonefishes, commonly known as clownfish,
rely on anemones, inter alia, for protection, habitat stability for laying eggs, and the benefit of
eating anemone waste and tentacles); sea also FINDING NEMO (Walt Disney Pictures, Pixar
Animation Studios 2003); TANYA ANDERSON, GIRAFFE EXTINCTION: USING SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY TO SAVE THE GENTLE GIANTS 55 (2020) (describing the reliance phenomenon by
discussing how “[t]icks burrow into a giraffe’s skin and . . . . Oxpeckers walk all over a giraffe’s
body inspecting for ticks to grab with their yellow bills,” and then some oxpeckers spend the
night “hanging out (literally) in [the] giraffe’s armpit”).
38 Syverud, supra note 36, at 1114 (“[W]e tend to place insurance in the reactive role: tort
litigation expands, liability insurance adjusts; courts create a new type of tort, insurance
companies respond with a new type of policy; juries award larger verdicts, insurance companies
raise their premiums. We look to changes in tort law and civil procedure for the causes of
changes in liability insurance. Tort litigation, not liability insurance, dominates the
relationship.”).
39 Id. (“Without liability insurance, most tort suits would be significantly less attractive to
plaintiffs and their attorneys, and a large fraction of the lawsuits and the tort law bar would fade
away.”).
40 Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance Defense Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV.
2053, 2054 (“[T]here is relatively little research, either empirical or theoretical, focused
specifically on the lawyers who routinely stand opposite the plaintiffs’ bar: the insurance
defense bar.”). When Professor Engstrom started her research, there had been little systematic
study of the plaintiffs’ bar, either. Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487
n.7.
41 H. LAURENCE ROSS, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE CLAIMS
ADJUSTMENT (2d ed. Routledge 1980) (1970); see Christopher J. Robinette, Two Roads Diverge
for Civil Recourse Theory, 88 IND. L.J. 543, 555 (2013) (noting that H. Laurence Ross provided
“considerable empirical data about how claims adjusters actually work.”); see also Syverud,
supra note 36, at 1138 (referring to H. Laurence Ross’s finding that in settlement negotiations
with attorneys, claims adjusters use the bargaining tactic of asking a supervisor to allow a high
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University at Buffalo, studied insurance claims adjusters and their supervisors.42 “The
adjuster,” Ross explained, “is, then, the key man in the handling of most automobile
injury claims.”43 Even Ross’s gender-specific language—empirically accurate at the
time—dates his work. Today, a majority of insurance claims agents are women.44
This Article crosses from the plaintiffs’ side to look at the work of insurance
defense lawyers. When not extrapolating from Ross’s old conclusions about “claims
men,” Professor Engstrom and others mostly leave to their readers’ imaginations the
inner workings of insurance claims handling and insurance defense.45 Professor
Engstrom shows how plaintiffs’ lawyers in settlement mills engage in routinized
practices, conduct very little factual investigation, and take shortcuts to achieve the
quick settlement of small cases.46
Which side’s questionable practices came first is an anemone-and-clownfish type
of question that this Article does not seek to answer. The simple insight is that,
titillating as studies of plaintiffs’ lawyers may be, additional study of the plaintiffs’
side without a correlative look into defense work perpetuates a distorted view of tort
litigation. Personal injury claims and litigation are, obviously, dualistic with the
opposing sides forming dialectically. My hunch is that the imbalance of research—the
sustained focus on the plaintiffs’ bar rather than a multi perspectival approach—
reflects a Mugwumpish worldview of elite law professors who want to distance
themselves—and their students—from the business practices and zealous
representation of personal injury lawyers.

settlement amount only to be denied and forced to return to the attorney claiming that a lower
agreement must be reached).
42 ROSS, supra note 41.
43 ROSS, supra note 41, at 25.
44 Women account for 82% of “[i]nsurance claims and policy clerks” and about 60% of the
insurance industry’s total workforce. Facts + Statistics: Careers and Employment, INS. INFO.
INST.,
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-careers-and-employment
[https://perma.cc/3H99-5WJ2].
45 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1508 (describing negotiations between
non-lawyer employees at settlement-mill firms and insurance claims adjusters that were fairly
brief and rarely included the discussion of any legal issues such as comparative negligence).
46 Id. at 1494 (“[E]ven the initial client interview was mechanized: clients were shown a video
of their attorney explaining the case settlement process, rather than having a real-live attorney
provide that information.”); see also id. at 1494–95 (“[G]roup settlement meetings with claims
adjusters were conducted, and numerous clients’ claims were resolved at one sitting.”);
Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 850 (“Settlement mills do not typically engage in a finegrained assessment of fault; they invest little in each case’s factual and legal development; and
they sometimes delegate ‘legal work’ to non-lawyer personnel.”).
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II. CAR CRASHES AND PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION IN COLORADO
Torts is about car crashes.47 When I tell people outside of law schools that I teach
torts, I say the subject is car crashes. There are all sorts of other types of cases included
in torts textbooks.48 In this way, the torts course misrepresents the actual work of
personal injury claiming and litigation. Car crashes are not sexy.
Car crashes are the paradigm single-event torts.49 Single-event means an individual
incident that leads to an injury of, typically, one or a few people.50 A car speeds, runs
a stop sign, fails to signal while changing lanes, or does not stop in time and—
boom!—crashes into another. Maybe the drivers share some comparative fault. Their
combined crash is a single-event tort. Likewise, when the Amazon delivery person
slips and falls on icy front steps; the dog bites the neighbor kid; a doctor misdiagnoses
a patient; or a lawyer misses the statute of limitations for a client, we refer to these
incidents as single-event torts. One person is injured, maybe several. The injury arises
from a single event—one crash, one fall, one bite, or one professional error. Plane
crashes are single-event torts with more injuries.51
Single-event tort litigation differs from other realms. Mass torts, for example, deal
with many different injuries to masses of people by similar but maybe not identical
mechanisms.52 With mass torts, there are multiple parties and lawsuits in multiple

47 See Nora Freeman Engstrom, When Cars Crash: The Automobile’s Tort Law Legacy, 22
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 293, 295 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, When Cars Crash] (“Of those
hurt in auto accidents, roughly half seek third-party compensation. These compensation
attempts are the 800-pound gorilla of the tort liability system, accounting for more than half of
all trials, nearly two-thirds of all injury claims, and three-quarters of all damage payouts.”).
48 RICHARD EPSTEIN & CATHERINE SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (12th ed. 2020);
MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed.
2016); DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (5th ed. 2017); VICTOR
E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS (14th
ed. 2020).
49 Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299 (quoting scholars who have observed
that automobile claims are the paradigm for individualized dispute resolution in the tort system).
50 Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and
Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 854 (1990) (referring to “single-event incidents of
negligence (such as car accidents)”).
51 Mass tort scholars also use the term “single-event” to refer to mass accidents. Linda S.
Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: Fund
Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 121, 125 (2002) (“The events
that occurred on September 11, 2001 encompass certain characteristics typical of mass accident
cases, such as a single site, single event disaster; a large number of claimants; little geographical
dispersion of claimants; and combined claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and property
damage.”); see also § 1783 Class Actions in Which Common Questions Predominate Over
Individual Questions—Mass-Accident Cases, 7AA Wright & Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1783 (3d ed. 2005) (referring to “mass-accident or single-event cases” of mass
torts).
52 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.2 (4th ed. 2004); see NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW
DICTIONARY, https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/mass-tort-term.html [https://perma.cc/NY2JA3PX]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1407; Linda S. Mullenix, Practical Wisdom and Third-Generation
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jurisdictions.53 Litigation against Monsanto or Bayer over the weed-killer Roundup
causing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma is a good example of a mass tort.54 When a TV
commercial asks, “Injured by [insert drug name here]?” mass tort lawyers are
advertising for clients.55 “Injured in a car crash?” A single-event tort lawyer wants
your business.56
Class actions, when torts at all, are also not usually single-event torts.57 Class
actions are about multiple parties injured in pretty much the same way by pretty much

Mass Tort Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 553 (1998). See generally LINDA S. MULLENIX,
MASS TORT LITIGATION, CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2017).
53 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.3 (4th ed. 2004).
54 See Agricultural Management, 2018 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T ENERGY & RES. COMM. REP. 1, 1–2
(reporting on the first cancer patient, Dewayne Johnson, to take Monsanto to court because of
California’s trial accessibility for dying plaintiffs, which lead the way for what was over 10,000
pending cases against Bayer at the time); Kate Halloran, A Holistic Approach to Pesticide
Litigation, TRIAL, May 2020, at 28, 29–34 (interviewing Jennifer A. Moore and Aimee Wagstaff
who led the plaintiff‘s team that tried the initial bellwether case for federal multidistrict
litigation involving Monsanto's Roundup and allegations that it causes non-Hodgkin’s
lymphoma); see also Ruth Bender et al., Bayer to Pay up to $10.9 Billion to Settle Lawsuits
over Roundup Weedkiller, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2020, 6:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-reaches-10-5-billion-settlement-over-weedkiller-roundup11593017309 [https://perma.cc/3H99-5WJ2]; see also Laura Kusisto et al., Bayer Strives to End
Lawsuits Over Roundup—While Still Selling It, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:57 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bayer-strives-to-end-lawsuits-over-roundupwhile-still-selling-it11581535816 [https://perma.cc/BGG6-UPFY]; Sara Randazzo & Jacob Bunge, Inside the
Mass-Tort Machine That Powers Thousands of Roundup Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2019,
11:48
AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/inside-the-mass-tort-machine-that-powersthousands-of-roundup-lawsuits-11574700480 [https://perma.cc/2TAY-4AWA].
55 Clifford Symposium on Tort Law and Social Policy, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2016);
Symposium, The Changing Landscape of the Practice, Financing and Ethics of Civil Litigation
in the Wake of the Tobacco Wars, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001); Symposium, Judges as Tort
Lawmakers, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 275 (1999); MASS TORTS MADE PERFECT, https://mtmp.com/
[https://perma.cc/5F77-MRXM].
56 Engstrom, Legal Access, supra note 24, at 1089–90 (describing how, in the years after the
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona decision, advertisements for legal services, and specifically
personal injury legal services have increased significantly); Rebecca L. Sandefur, Bridging the
Gap: Rethinking Outreach for Greater Access to Justice, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 721,
734 (2015) (“Readers who watch contemporary commercial television will be familiar with
advertisements for personal-injury attorneys. These ads often focus on a specific problem—a
disease, an injury due to an accident, an injury caused by a medical device—and they explain
to the viewer that compensation may be available for them if they have that problem, and that
the advertiser may be able to provide help in getting that compensation.”).
57 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 22.2 (4th ed. 2004); Linda S. Mullenix, Practical
Wisdom and Third-Generation Mass Tort Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 551, 553 (1998); see
also Samuel Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 371
(2012); Charles Silver, Comparing Class Actions and Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 501
(1991); Charles E. Reuther, Class Actions and the Quest for A Fair Resolution in Mass Tort
Litigation, N.J. LAW. MAG., Aug. 2011, at 33.
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the same mechanism but often at different times.58 A single plaintiff or small group of
plaintiffs represents the entire class of injured parties in one big lawsuit.59 The best
version of class actions brings about social justice on a large scale.60 Too commonly
in the past, the attorneys took huge fees and injured consumers got a coupon of some
sort.61 Federal legislation, the Class Action Fairness Act, addressed the coupon issue.62
Workers’ compensation cases fall outside the single-event tort system too.63 An
employee may suffer a discrete injury in a single event, but for about the last century,

58 The federal rules require that “(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(a). The Colorado rules replicate the federal rules. COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“(1) The
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law
or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class.”); see also Oakley & Coon, supra note 3 (discussing state
replication of federal rules); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.22 (4th ed. 2004).
59 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); COLO. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
60 Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class
Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 402 (2014) (“During th[e] so-called golden age of class litigation
[in the late 1960s and early 1970s], public interest lawyers used the class action mechanism to
integrate school systems, deinstitutionalize mental health facilities, reform conditions of
confinement for inmates in prison systems, challenge discriminatory housing and public
accommodation laws, and address various types of employment discrimination.”). For Professor
Mullenix’s examples of social justice victories through class actions, see id. at 402 n.7 (first
citing Soc’y for the Good Will to Retarded Child., Inc. v. Cuomo, 572 F. Supp. 1300, 1302–03
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering corrective measures to residents at a state institution for
constitutional violations, beginning an eleven-year litigation saga culminating in a settlement),
vacated, 737 F.2d 1239, 1242 (2d Cir. 1984); then citing Manicone v. Cleary, No. 74 C 575,
slip op. (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1975) (allowing prisoners to access telephones, subject to certain
limitations); then citing United States v. Kahane, 396 F. Supp. 687, 689 (E.D.N.Y.) (requiring
the government to provide kosher food to an Orthodox Jewish prisoner), modified sub nom.
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 493 (2d Cir. 1975); then citing Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383
F. Supp. 699, 706–07 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (ordering integration of a Coney Island middle school
as the proper relief for racial segregation), aff’d, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975); and then citing
Wilson v. Beame, 380 F. Supp. 1232, 1244, 1248–52, (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting preliminary
injunction allowing Muslim pretrial detainees to participate in religious services)).
61 Robert B. Gerard & Scott A. Johnson, The Role of the Objector in Class Action Settlements—
A Case Study of the General Motors Truck “Side Saddle” Fuel Tank Litigation, 31 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 409, 411 (1998) (discussing General Motors settling a class action by providing each
member of the class with a $1,000 coupon for a future General Motors vehicle purchase while
paying the plaintiffs’ attorneys $9.5 million in fees).
62 28 U.S.C. § 1712; Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 80
TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1632–33 (2006).
63 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 352–55 (2002).
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an administrative law system has handled these claims separately from the tort
system.64
A. The Dispute Pyramid or Salmon Run
To understand whether there are many or few personal injury lawsuits requires
empirical knowledge concerning how many people are injured.65 Sociolegal scholars
refer to the “dispute pyramid” when situating the number of lawsuits or trials within a
broader context.66 The dispute pyramid tries to settle the litigation process within the
context of injuries, claims, visits to lawyers, and demands.67 An important effect of
the dispute pyramid analysis is to show that a small proportion of injuries leads to
lawsuits.68 Some people never even know they are injured; most know of the injury
but lump it—that is, they blame no one and make no claim; some people do blame
someone else or complain; as the number dwindles, some file grievances of some sort;
a hardy few see lawyers; and lawyers, who have businesses to run, select only some
of those cases for the filing of litigation.69
Elsewhere, I have argued that the architectural or geometric metaphor of a pyramid
misleadingly suggests smooth decline from one level to another.70 A better metaphor
would be a salmon run in which thousands of eggs yield very, very few fish that return
upstream to spawn because during their life cycles they encounter all sorts of lethal,
natural, and human-made obstacles with, sometimes, the final obstacle being an
upstream leap out of the water right into the mouth of a big ol’ bear.71 As the

64 Id.; G. EDWARD WHITE, AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 104–05
(2013).
65 See Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099 (describing the “Dispute Pyramid” as the standard way
scholars visualize tort litigation and noting that the layer formed by injuries is below the level
of claims).
66 Id. (“In order to understand the system of tort litigation, it is useful to visualize it, in the
standard way that legal studies scholars do, as a ‘pyramid’ made up of successive layers.”); see
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, and Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 632 (laying out a framework for the emergence
and transformation of disputes including before a dispute has reached the legal system).
67 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099; Felstiner et al. supra note 66.
68 Russell, supra note 9.
69 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099–1102; Felstiner et al. supra note 66, at 636.
70 Russell, supra note 9.
71 MARK KURLANSKY, SALMON: A FISH, THE EARTH, AND THE HISTORY OF A COMMON FATE, 51,
63 (2020) (illustrating bears in the process of catching salmon); id. at 61 (describing salmon’s
urge to return to the river and reproduce even though in the end it will be the death for most of
the salmon); id. at 70 (discussing that half of the salmon’s fertilized eggs will die or be eaten
and roughly eight percent will survive the journey back and reach the ocean).
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demotivational poster of despair.com notes: “The journey of a thousand miles
sometimes ends very, very badly.”72
B. The Denominator Problem
Empirical researchers ought to collect and not just imagine data for what Professor
Marc Galanter, of the University of Wisconsin, called the “bottom layer.”73 Empirical
scholars should make an effort when presenting the dispute pyramid or salmon run to
start at least one level before injuries.74 Researchers should describe the underlying
activity in empirical terms to provide context for the number of injuries.75 The raw
number of people injured at McDonald’s will doubtless sound very high, but in the
context of billions and billions served, the number injured may be less startling. I call
this the denominator problem.
To say there are a lot of lawsuits can only make sense if one knows the
denominator. Consider medical malpractice.76 Lawsuits concerning the negligent
errors of doctors require a denominator, which could be the number of patients, the
number of radiological studies read, or perhaps the total number of patient-related
decisions. As I show below, there are very few medical malpractice lawsuits in
Colorado, and those suits are a small part of all personal injury litigation. Placing the
small number of medical malpractice lawsuits on top of a denominator of opportunities
for doctor error makes clearer just how scarce medical malpractice claims are.
For car crashes, there are any number of possible denominators. The Federal
Highway Administration of the United States Department of Transportation produces
a Highway Statistics Series77 with aggregate data for each state.78 This series includes
a number of different variables against which one might reasonably compare to the
number of car crashes.79 For example, one might compare the number of crashes to

72
Ambition,
DESPAIR.COM,
https://despair.com/collections/posters/products/ambition?variant=2457295747
[https://perma.cc/4ZL5-CWJ8].
73 Galanter, supra note 9, at 1099 (“We can imagine a bottom layer consisting of all the events
in which, for example, a particular product was used or encountered.”).
74 Id. at 1101 (beginning dispute pyramids with the “grievances” layer).
75 Id. at 1099.
76 See TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2006) (explaining that medical
malpractice litigation is the exception, rather than the norm, when doctors injure patients).
77 Highway Statistics 2018, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Stat. 2018],
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2018/ [https://perma.cc/TP9G-VFPN].
78 Highway Statistics Series: State Statistical Abstracts 2012—Colorado, FED. HIGHWAY
ADMIN.
[hereinafter
FHWA
Colo.
Abstract
2012],
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/abstracts/2012/co.cfm
[https://perma.cc/543S-H9HG].
79 Id.
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the state’s population or the number of driving licenses in the state.80 The more drivers
a state has, the more crashes there would likely be. Likewise, the number of vehicle
registrations in the state would seem to correlate with how often drivers crash cars.81
However, neither the number of licenses nor the number of cars would take into
account visitors from outside the state, which could make a difference in Colorado,
which has a substantial tourism industry.82
Another possible denominator might be the length of roadways. The Highway
Administration collects data on “public road length,” which measures just how much
road there is.83 Even more specific, “functional system length” also includes the total
length of all lanes, so that a four-lane road measures twice what a two-lane road
measures.84 But, does more road lead to more or fewer crashes?
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration uses all these variables as
denominators. In the series titled “Traffic Safety Facts,” NHTSA reported traffic
fatality and injury rates per population, licensed drivers, registered motor vehicles,
and, finally, vehicle-miles traveled.85 Doubtless, a complex multiple regression study
incorporating all the different data is possible, though likely not comprehensible.
Vehicle-miles traveled is the best broadest denominator for use with the number
of car crashes as the numerator. Transportation engineers and highway departments
use vehicle-miles traveled (“VMT”) to measure annual traffic.86 NHTSA reports
fatalities and injuries per million VMT.87 Intuitively, the more miles cars travel, the
more crashes one would expect. Whether creeping along in rush-hour traffic on the
405 in Los Angeles somehow alters the correlation between crashes and miles traveled
is not a question I am prepared to answer.
Furthermore, VMT is the best datum for the additional layer that I propose for
dispute pyramids generally. To understand whether many or just a few people are
suing Walmart, one needs to know how many customers there are. The number of
Walmart customers multiplied by their time inside the store is a better analogy to

80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See generally DEAN RUNYAN ASSOCS., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TRAVEL ON COLORADO
2000–2018P (June 2019), https://industry.colorado.com/sites/default/files/COImp%20%20with%20National.pdf [https://perma.cc/XXP6-E544].
83 FHWA Colo. Abstract 2012, supra note 78.
84 Id.
85 NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., DOT HS 812806, TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2017
(2019)
[hereinafter
NHTSA
REPORT
2017],
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812806 [https://perma.cc/Q2REMC7Z].
86 See FHWA Stat. 2018, supra note 77 (“The FHWA uses daily vehicle-miles of travel . . . as
the primary measure of travel activity on the Nation’s highway systems.”). See generally
NHTSA REPORT 2017, supra note 86 (using VMT to measure vehicle-accident rates).
87 NHTSA REPORT 2017, supra note 86, at 84.
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VMT. Do law students often sue their law schools?88 The number of suits means
nothing without the number of students and law schools. Likewise, with doctors sued
for malpractice: how many patients do they treat? For every claim about the frequency
of litigation that includes a temporal marker like “often,” “frequently,” or
“increasingly,” an appropriate denominator is crucial. That is, researchers need to
compute injury rates and not just the number of injury cases.
Plaintiffs filed the lawsuits that this Article analyzes in 2015.89 Mostly, the crashes
did not happen in 2015. Because the statute of limitations for filing an automobilerelated personal injury lawsuit is three years in Colorado,90 most of the driving that
led to the crashes took place in 2012 and 2013. More specific detail on the time
between injury and the filing of lawsuits is below.91 In 2012, Colorado saw 46,769
million VMT with 46,968 million the following year.92 Averaging the two yields
46,868 million vehicle-miles. This denominator is, of course, imperfect. Some
plaintiffs filed their 2015 lawsuits within months of their injuries (data for time of
filing are below), so I might instead vary the calculation of the denominator in some
fussier way that would add nothing to the analysis.
C. Number of Injury Crashes in Colorado
The next empirical step is to join the roughly 46,868 million VMT to the dispute
pyramid using the number of injury crashes. When law enforcement officers—police,
highway patrol, sheriffs—respond to a car crash, they fill out a document called, until
2019, a Traffic Accident Report (“TAR”).93 The report calls for a variety of

88 For examples of law students suing their law schools, see Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y.L. Sch.,
943 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), aff'd, 956 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); Harnish
v. Widener Univ. Sch. of L., 931 F. Supp. 2d 641 (D.N.J. 2013); Austin v. Albany L. Sch. of
Union Univ., 957 N.Y.S.2d 833 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013); Casey v. Fla. Coastal Sch. of L., Inc.,
No. 3:14-CV-01229, 2015 WL 10818746 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2015); Sixth Amended
Complaint, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of L., No. 37-2011-00091898, 2015 WL
10634633 (Cal. Super. Oct. 20, 2015); Complaint at 4–5, Barkhordar v. Harv. Univ., No. 1:20CV-11203, 2020 WL 3444027 (D. Mass. June 22, 2020); Rojas v. Fla. Bd. of Governors Found.,
Inc., Filing No. 107008592 (Fla. Leon Cnty. Ct. May 4, 2020); Nathan Hale, Fla. Sued for
(May
4,
2020),
Campus
Fees
During
COVID-19
Shutdown,
LAW360
https://www.law360.com/articles/1270285/fla-sued-for-campus-fees-during-covid-19shutdown [https://perma.cc/ST7Z-XWUE].
89 The data for car crash complaints and answers are from January through June of 2015. I
analyzed 298 complaints and 356 answers.
90 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-101(1)(n)(I) (2016).
91 See infra Section III.D.
92 Highway Statistics 2013, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Statistics 2013],
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2013/
[https://perma.cc/8DLBBWVK]; Highway Statistics 2012, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. [hereinafter FHWA Statistics 2012],
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2012/ [https://perma.cc/86C9-3C2D].
93 See COLO. STATE TRAFFIC RECS. ADVISORY COMM., INVESTIGATING OFFICER’S TRAFFIC
ACCIDENT REPORTING MANUAL 14–15 (2006) [hereinafter COLORADO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
REPORTING
MANUAL],
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/Accident%20Reporting%20Manual%20R
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information about the vehicles involved, the drivers, the road conditions, indications
of alcohol or drug use, and, of course, the injuries.94 Like most law enforcement
agencies in the United States and many throughout the world, Colorado uses a fivepoint scale to code the severity of injuries.95 The National Safety Council (“NSC”)
established the KABCO scale, as it is called, in 1966.96 For crashes with a fatality,
police use a 4 or K for Killed; Colorado police use the numbers not the letters. Next is
an incapacitating injury, which the police code as 3 or A. Non-incapacitating injuries
are 2 (B); possible injuries are 1 (C); and no injury is 0 (O). Since 2012, something
called the Minimum Model Uniform Crash Criteria (“MMUCC”) of the Federal
Highway Administration has shifted the standard for A from “incapacitating [injury]”
to “suspected serious injury” and for B from “non-incapacitating [injury]” to
“suspected minor injury.”97
With regard to statewide reporting of motor vehicle injuries, an interesting bit of
data selection and bias by the state of Colorado emerges. The actual form that
Colorado law enforcement officials used from 2006 to 2019 differed from the
MMUCC and NSC language.98 Colorado’s Traffic Accident Report identified 3 (A)
as “evident – incapacitating injury”; 2 (B) as “evident – non-incapacitating injury”;
and 1 (C) as “complaint of injury.”99 The chief engineer for the Colorado Department
of Transportation aggregates data from the TARs and, annually, provides monthly data
by county for the number of fatalities, injuries, and property damage-only (“PDO”)
accidents.100 The first category includes the 4s; the second includes 3s, 2s, and 1s, and
the last category, with no personal injuries and damage only to property are the 0s.101
For the period from July of 2012 through June of 2013, the chief engineer reported
103,687 crashes for this period with 25,760 injury accidents; 438 fatalities; and 77,489

ev%2007-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/W36Y-UFL9]. In 2019, the Colorado Department of
Transportation updated the form and renamed it the Traffic Crash Report. COLO. DEP’T OF
REVENUE, STATE OF COLORADO TRAFFIC CRASH REPORT (2019) [hereinafter COLORADO
TRAFFIC
CRASH
REPORT],
https://www.codot.gov/about/committees/strac/dr3447folder/dr3447-crash-report-official-released-form [https://perma.cc/C3WE-47UQ].
94 See COLORADO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTING MANUAL, supra note 93, at 14, 37, 45.
95 Id. at 49.
96 Beau Burdett et al., Accuracy of Injury Severity Ratings on Police Crash Reports, TRANSP.
RSCH. REC. 58, 58–59 (2015).
97 Id. at 59.
98 COLORADO TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REPORTING MANUAL, supra note 93, at 14.
99 Id. at 49.
100 The data flow from the TARs to the Department of Revenue and thence to the Colorado
Department of Transportation. For a description of the process for handling and cleaning the
data, see OFF. OF THE CHIEF ENGINEER, COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., ANNUAL TRAFFIC ACCIDENT
REPORT
(2018)
[hereinafter
CDOT
ANNUAL
ACCIDENT
REPORT],
https://www.codot.gov/safety/traffic-safety/assets/crash-data/county-crashes-by-severity
[https://perma.cc/6M9S-4GXN].
101 Id.
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non-injury or PDO crashes.102 The proportion of injury crashes, at 24.8% of all
crashes, is roughly consistent with the national figure of just under 30% of crashes
being injury crashes.103 PDO crashes are about 70% of all crashes nationally and just
about 75% in Colorado.104
A different division of the Colorado Department of Transportation reported lower
figures for car crash injuries in the state: just 9,900 injury crashes for 2012 and a
slightly lower number, 9,649, for 2013.105 The average of these two figures, 9,775, is
just 37.9% of the Chief Engineer’s figure for injury crashes.106 The reason for the
difference is that a Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment injury
epidemiologist writes the report on annual injuries for the Colorado Department of
Transportation, and she disregards injuries that law enforcement officers code as 1 or
C on the KABCO scale.107 “Yes, that is correct,” the epidemiologist explained to me,
“I do not count the ‘complaint of injury’ as an injury. Only evident injuries (both
incapacitating and non-incapacitating).”108 Her published reports of just the 3s and 2s
sometimes call these “serious injuries” and other times misleadingly suggest the 3s
and 2s constitute all the injuries.109
There are numerous studies comparing the KABCO evaluations of police officers
with those of medical personnel.110 These studies confirm, unsurprisingly, that

102 Id. at 7–8.
103 There were roughly 5,615,000 crashes in the United States in 2012. There were 31,006 fatal
crashes. 1,634,00 or 29.1% were injury crashes, and 3,950,000 or 70.3% were PDO crashes.
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. & FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 2015 STATUS OF THE
NATION’S HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, AND TRANSIT: CONDITIONS AND PERFORMANCE ES-8 (2015)
[hereinafter
FHWA
2015
STATUS
REPORT],
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policy/2015cpr/pdfs/2015cpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/33MA-VGPR];
NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS,
DOT HS 811 856, at 4 (2013) [hereinafter NHTSA 2013 TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS],
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/811856 [https://perma.cc/44KNFQR4].
104 CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8; NHTSA 2013 TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS, supra note 103, at 4; accord FHWA 2015 STATUS REPORT, supra note 103, at ES-8.
105 COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION REPORT 10 (2018) [hereinafter CDOT
PROBLEM REPORT], https://www.codot.gov/safety/safetydata/colorado-problem-identificationid-reports/archived-problem-id-reports/2018-problem-id-report
[https://perma.cc/58ZST7YZ].
106 Id.; CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8.
107 Email on file with the author. In her report, the epidemiologist refers to and conflates
injuries and what she calls serious injuries. CDOT PROBLEM REPORT, supra note 105, at 10–12.
108 Email on file with author. The language concerning incapacitating and non-incapacitating
is from earlier versions of the KABCO scale.
109 CDOT PROBLEM REPORT, supra note 105.
110 See, e.g., Cynthia Burch et al., A Comparison of KABCO and AIS Injury Severity Metrics
Using CODES Linked Data, 15 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 627, 627–30 (2014); id. at 630
(“A[bbreviated] I[njury] S[cale] codes are determined by clinical personnel who have access to
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physicians and medical personnel do a better job at diagnosis than police, but the
studies also show no basis for excluding KABCO Cs from the count of those
injured.111 This Article therefore uses the chief engineer’s totals for car crash injuries
and not the lower figure of the injury epidemiologist.
D.

Number and Type of Personal Injury Lawsuits in Colorado

During 2012–13, there were 25,760 motor vehicle crashes with injuries and 46,868
million vehicle-miles traveled.112 This is 0.55 injury crashes for each million VMT.
Car crash lawsuits may follow injury crashes. Do they usually?
Car crash lawsuits dominate the various categories of personal injury litigation in
Colorado.113 The same is true in other states.114 Lawyers file lawsuits online in

all medical records for the individual, whereas KABCO is determined by police officers at the
scene of the crash based on appearance and circumstances, not clinical evaluation.”); see also
Burdett et al., supra note 96 (comparing accuracy of KABCO evaluations by law enforcement
officers to actual health outcomes as rated by medical practitioners); Charles P. Compton, Injury
Severity Codes: A Comparison of Police Injury Codes and Medical Outcomes as Determined
by NASS CDS Investigators, 36 J. SAFETY RSCH. 483, 483–84 (2005) (same); Charles M.
Farmer, Reliability of Police-Reported Information for Determining Crash and Injury Severity,
4 TRAFFIC INJ. PREVENTION 38, 38–44 (2003) (same); K.L. Tsui et al., Misclassification of Injury
Severity Among Road Casualties in Police Reports, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 84,
84–89 (2009) (same).
111 Burch et al., supra note 110, at 629.
112 CDOT ANNUAL ACCIDENT REPORT, supra note 100, at 7–8; FHWA Statistics 2013, supra
note 92, at VM-2 (5.4.1, vehicle miles of travel by functional system),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2013/vm2.cfm [https://perma.cc/E4RT7ADZ];
FHWA
Statistics
2012,
supra
note
92,
at
VM-2
(same),
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics/2012/vm2.cfm [https://perma.cc/FP3K4PPS].
113 COLO. JUD. BRANCH, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 29 (2015)
JUDICIAL
STATISTICS
2015],
[hereinafter
COLORADO
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/Planning_and_Analysis/Annual_S
tatistical_Reports/2015/FY2015%20Annual%20Statistical%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6JK-DFFQ].
114 See CT. STAT. PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD DIGEST: 2018 DATA 10 (2020),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/40820/2018-Digest.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AL5L-465T] (“In the 16 states who provided a composition of tort case types
. . . most are dominated by automobile accident cases.”); see also CHIEF ADM’R OF THE CTS.,
NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM: 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2019),
https://www.nycourts.gov/legacypdfs/19_UCS-Annual_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/935LV7Y2] (reporting that of 452,414 civil filings in N.Y. State Supreme Courts in 2019, 16% were
motor vehicle related, third to uncontested matrimonials (20.5%) and residential foreclosures
(22%)); JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., 2019 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD
TRENDS
2008–09
THROUGH
2017–18,
at
112
(2019),
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2019-Court-Statistics-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92S8-HJRK] (reporting 41,839 motor vehicle related civil filings in California
Superior Courts, compared to 23,402 filings of all other personal injury claims); OFFICE OF CT.
ADMIN. & TEX. JUD. COUNCIL, ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY FISCAL
YEAR 2019, at 5 (2019) https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1445760/fy-19-annual-statistical-
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Colorado, and when e-filing, the lawyer must select a case type or category for the
litigation.115 Filing clerks sometimes confirm that the lawyer picked the right case
type.116 Some of the non-tort case types are, for example, breach of contract,
declaratory judgment, goods sold and delivered, note, replevin, and sexual
harassment.117 The state’s category titles for personal injury and other tort lawsuits
include personal injury, personal injury–motor vehicle, wrongful death, and wrongful
death–motor vehicle.118 A separate case type called, simply, negligence, might be
about personal injury or could be property damage.119 There is also a case type called
property damage.120 Finally, there is a category titled malpractice, which includes
claims against medical providers who cause personal injuries but also includes claims
against lawyers, accountants, and architects—claims that may be solely for economic
or property damage.121
Because my subthesis is that car crashes dominate personal injury litigation, I have
aggregated all the various categories of tort claims that do or might include personal
injuries for comparison with car crash cases. The six case types in alphabetical order
are malpractice, negligence, personal injury, personal injury–motor vehicle, wrongful
death, and wrongful death–motor vehicle. I have not included the case types of fraud,
property damage, or public nuisance.122 My selection of categories against which I
compare car crash cases is overbroad or overinclusive, though not, I think, by much.
The six categories of case types comprise Colorado’s personal injury lawsuits. For
2015, Colorado District Courts saw total filings of 224,591 new cases of all types with
civil filings being the largest category (101,112), followed by criminal (40,903),
domestic relations (34,841), juvenile (24,681), and probate (15,728).123

report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2244-M4QW] (reporting that in all Texas courts in 2019, 55,300
personal injury or property damage cases filed involved a motor vehicle, compared to 13,622
injury or damage cases not involving a motor vehicle).
115 COLO. JUD. BRANCH, ATTORNEY TRAINING MANUAL: COLORADO COURTS E-FILING 76
(2017),
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Administration/ITS/EFiling/Training_Manual_Att
orney.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DC3-ACQL].
116 Id. at 72.
117 See generally COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113.
118 Id. at 25, 27.
119 Id. at 25.
120 Id. at 26.
121 Id. at 25.
122 Fraud, though a tort, does not likely lead to personal injury. Property damage is what it
says. And public nuisance is special—it may include personal injury but has comparatively few
cases. Id. at 24–27.
123 Id. at 17.
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Personal injury lawsuits were just shy of five percent of the total number of new
civil filings.124 The distribution of new personal injury cases in 2015 was:
Table 1: 2015 Colorado Personal Injury Cases Filed
Personal Injury Case Types

2015 Cases Filed

Percentage

Malpractice

212

4.3%

Negligence

450

9.1%

Personal Injury

1,217

24.6%

Personal Injury–Motor Vehicle

2,974

60.2%

Wrongful Death

64

1.3%

Wrongful Death–Motor Vehicle

27

0.5%

Total125

4,944

100.0%

As I noted above, the number of malpractice cases is tiny. My best estimate, based
on prior research, is that roughly two-thirds of the malpractice lawsuits are filed
against physicians—around 140 cases—hardly the reign of terror that physicians fear
and not really enough lawsuits to allow for tort law’s regulatory function.126
Motor vehicle injuries dominate the personal injury category with 60.2% of all
filings. This case type, personal injury–motor vehicle, is the category of answers that
I analyze. Wrongful death cases involving motor vehicles, which I have not included
in my sample of answers, totaled just 27 for the year and amounted to 0.5% of all
personal injury filings.
The 2,974 car crash lawsuits of 2015 amounted to 2.9% of all the new civil actions
in 2015.127 Personal injury litigation is but a small component of all civil litigation in
Colorado—not a flood and certainly not enough to overwhelm the courts.
Comparing the filed lawsuits with the number of injury crashes, Colorado had
2,974 motor vehicle injury lawsuits filed in 2015 from a total of 25,760 injury car
crashes. That is, 11.5% of injury car crashes or just under one in nine resulted in a

124 Id. at 25–29.
125 Id.
126 BAKER, supra note 76, at 23.
127 COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113, at 29.
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personal injury lawsuit. Every million vehicle-miles in Colorado yielded 0.061
personal injury lawsuits.128
For ease of reference, then, Colorado had about 100,000 civil lawsuits in 2015 with
5% of those being personal injury lawsuits of some sort.129 Sixty percent of all personal
injury suits or 3% of all civil suits were car crash injury lawsuits. Coincidentally, the
state also had just over 100,000 motor vehicle crashes with roughly one-quarter having
injuries.130 For 88.5% of the injury car crashes, no litigation ensued. To be sure, there
were insurance claims without litigation for an uncertain number of these injury car
crashes, and the settlement of many of these insurance claims—without litigation—is
the subject of Professor Engstrom’s studies.131
Only one in nine injury car crashes yields a lawsuit. Once filed, insurance defense
lawyers answer the complaints on behalf of the insured defendants. Parts III and IV of
this Article discuss the work of these lawyers, nearly all of whom fall into the category
of insurance defense mill lawyers.
III. ANSWERS TO CAR CRASH COMPLAINTS
The real empirical focus of this Article is on the work of insurance defense mill
lawyers in answering complaints that lawyers file on behalf of people injured in car
crashes. I have already shown that only about one-quarter (24.8%) of Colorado’s car
crashes result in personal injuries.132 There is roughly one injury car crash for every
two million VMT.133 If while biking with your friends, you pass an injury car crash on
the highway or street in Colorado, I have shown that you can authoritatively say to
your friends that there is just a one in nine chance that there will be a lawsuit in
connection with the crash.134 But, what about insurance claims, your friends will ask?
There, you can say that the data are as yet unclear.135

128 This figure is consistent with Engstrom’s summary of existing empirical research.
Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299–300 (“[O]f those who initiate claims for
compensation, roughly half hire lawyers, while only a small proportion (11%, by one estimate)
actually file lawsuits.”).
129 See supra Table 1 and text accompanying notes 124–25.
130 See supra text accompanying note 102.
131 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1487 (“The settlement of routine
personal injury claims, especially when no lawsuit is initiated and trial is not a realistic
alternative, remains poorly understood.”).
132 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
133 See supra text accompanying note 113.
134 See supra text accompanying note 128.
135 Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 299–300 (reporting, based upon data that
an insurance industry research group sells, that roughly half of those injured in motor vehicle
accidents make an informal or formal attempt to collect from another party to the accident, and
of those who initiate claims, roughly half hire lawyers, and only 11% actually file lawsuits).
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In the first half of 2015, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed 1,538 civil lawsuits of the case
type “personal injury–motor vehicle” in Colorado.136 I sampled enough of these
lawsuits to achieve a margin of error of five percent. I aimed for 300 lawsuits, which
I selected using a random number generator from all car-crash lawsuits filed. After the
counting was done, two suits turned out to have answers missing from the case files,
so the sample includes 298 different lawsuits. There were two defendants in fortyeight suits, three in nine suits, and five in one more suit, so the total number of answers
for the 298 suits could have been as high as 357, but one answer was missing from the
case files. This Article therefore presents an analysis of 356 answers to 298 different
lawsuits. The 298 lawsuits are 19.4% of the total of 1,538 suits filed during the first
six months of 2015.
The margin of error is 5% with a 95% confidence level for this sample.137 When I
present a number that is a description of some aspect of the answers using a
percentage, I intend that descriptive percentage to represent the answers filed to all of
the 1,538 lawsuits filed during the same time period. The reader, however, should
know that my percentages should be read as plus or minus five percent. Note, however,
that this sampling error applies only to this section of the Article. The numbers before
this point in the Article, concerning the total number of crashes, represent the entire
universe or population of crashes. For total miles traveled, I adopted the state of
Colorado’s figures.
Regarding answers, Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure 8(b) directs that “[a] party
shall state in short and plain terms his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit
or deny the averments of the adverse party.”138 As I noted in the introduction, Colorado
Rule 8(b) offers three clear options to a defendant answering the averments of a
complaint.139 The defendant may admit or deny the averments or state that he is
“without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an
averment,” which statement “has the effect of a denial.”140 For each allegation, then,
the answer is yes, no, or I don’t know.
The late Judge Milton Shadur, Federal District Court Judge for the Northern
District of Illinois, is the hero of this story.141 Discussing Rule 8(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Shadur noted:

136 See COLORADO JUDICIAL STATISTICS 2015, supra note 113, at 29.
137
Margin
of
Error,
STAT
https://stattrek.com/statistics/dictionary.aspx?definition=margin%20of%20error
[https://perma.cc/NVS3-63SD].

TREK,

138 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). Similarly, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1) directs that “[i]n responding to a
pleading, a party must: (A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted
against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”
Colorado uses the term averment while the federal rules use allegation and claim.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 3–4.
140 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5) directs that “[a] party that lacks knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the
statement has the effect of a denial.”
141 Thomas D. Russell, Disrupting Frivolous Defenses, 52 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 911 (2021)
(Article at Part II), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3805181; Tony
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Even though the second sentence of Rule 8(b) marks out an unambiguous
path for any party that seeks the benefit of a deemed denial when he, she or
it can neither admit outright nor deny outright a plaintiff's allegation (or
plaintiff's “averment,” the word used in Rule 8(b)), too many lawyers, feel a
totally unwarranted need to attempt to be creative by straying from that clear
path.142
Judge Shadur’s order and accompanying appendix in State Farm v. Riley are the
models that I hope the state court judges in Colorado and other states will adopt
regarding answers by insurance defense mill lawyers.143
Of course, Judge Shadur wrote regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Colorado’s Rule 8 is essentially identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, though
slightly different in form and organization. As noted above, Colorado still uses the
word “averment,” but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 now uses “allegation” or
“claim.”144 These words are interchangeable. Colorado’s Rule of Civil Procedure
directs the defendant to “admit or deny the averments of the adverse party,”145 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 directs that the “party must . . . admit or deny the
allegations asserted against it by an opposing party.”146 Notably, Colorado’s Rule 8
does not limit the averments to which a defendant must respond to only those “asserted
against it.”147 The federal rule creates a separate subsection (b)(5) for what a party
lacking knowledge or information should do: “[a] party that lacks knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state,
and the statement has the effect of a denial.”148 Colorado’s Rule 8(b) uses “shall”
instead of “must” in a sentence that immediately follows the direction to admit or deny
averments: “If he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect of a denial.”149 One
difference between the rules is that the Colorado rule puts the “effect of failure to
deny” in a separate section (d) rather than within (b), whereas the federal rule includes
the “Effect of Failing to Deny” in 8(b)(6). Perhaps the most meaningful distinction
between Colorado’s Rule 8(b) and the corresponding federal rule concerns general
Briscoe, Milton Shadur, Federal Judge Who Oversaw Key Cases Involving Chicago Schools,
Cook
County
Jail,
Dies,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Jan.
16,
2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/obituaries/ct-met-milton-shadur-obituary-20180116story.html; Shadur, Milton I., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/shadurmilton-irving (last visited May 26, 2021).
142 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
143 See generally id.; Russell, supra note 141.
144 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1).
145 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
146 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B).
147 Id.
148 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(5).
149 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
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denials. Both rules allow but do not encourage general denials. Colorado’s rule
specifically points to Rule 11 as a sanction for a party improperly pleading a general
denial.150
Colorado appellate courts repeatedly have acknowledged that “when the Colorado
and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are essentially identical, case law interpreting
the federal rule is persuasive in analysis of the Colorado rule.”151 Because Colorado’s
Rule 8(b) is largely identical to corresponding federal rule, Colorado judges might
readily adopt Judge Shadur’s view that lawyers for defendants should answer
according to the federal rules. And, because thirty or more states pattern their rules of
civil procedure after the federal rules, the same principles apply in most states.152
In an appendix to his Memorandum Opinion and Order in State Farm v. Riley,
Judge Shadur singled out for criticism several different patterns of answer abuse that
he observed.153 Judge Shadur complained that “too many lawyers” strayed from Rule
8(b)’s “unambiguous path” for deemed denials.154 “[S]ome members of the same
coterie of careless defense counsel,” Judge Shadur noted, demand “‘strict proof,’
whatever that may mean.”155 “Strict proof,” the judge noted, “is nowhere to be found
in the Rules (or to this Court’s knowledge in any other set of rules or in any treatise
on the subject of pleading).”156 Judge Shadur also singled out in his appendix the
refusal to respond to “legal conclusions”;157 the claim that a document “Speaks for
Itself”;158 and any other failure or refusal to answer an allegation.159 Judge Shadur also
addressed Rule 8(c) and the topic of affirmative defenses in his appendix, which issue
I address below.

150 If the pleader “does . . . intend to controvert all its averments, including averments of the
grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends, he may do so by general denial subject to
the obligations set forth in Rule 11.” COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b). But see Lewis v. Buckskin Joe’s,
Inc., 396 P.2d 933, 939 (Colo. 1964) (“Rule 8(b), [COLO. R. CIV. P.] 8(b), outlines procedures
to be followed in pleading defenses. Needless to say, the rule contemplates an answer that
speaks the truth. The record here clearly demonstrates that none of the eleven above-mentioned
denials has any foundation in fact. Compliance with Rule 11, [COLO. R. CIV. P.] 11, should be
had in all pleadings. The general denial should not have been filed.”).
151 See, e.g., Forbes v. Goldenhersh, 899 P.2d 246, 249 (Colo. App. 1994).
152 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
153 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 278–80 (N.D. Ill. 2001). For an
extensive analysis of the appendix, see Russell, supra note 141, at 922.
154 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 279.
159 Id.
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A. Legal Conclusions
In nearly one-third (32.6%) of the answers (116 of 356), Colorado’s insurance
defense lawyers claimed that they need not respond to any allegation that called for a
legal conclusion. Judge Shadur would be angry.160
There is no basis in either the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for the defense attorneys’ refusal to reply to an allegation by
claiming that it calls for a legal conclusion.161 Once again, Rule 8(b) provides the
option of admitting or denying.162 The defendant may also state that he or she lacks
sufficient information—if that’s the truth, and the rules deem the allegation denied.
Judge Shadur explained that:
Another regular offender is the lawyer who takes it on himself or herself to decline
to respond to an allegation because it “states a legal conclusion.” That of course
violates the express Rule 8(b) requirement that all allegations must be responded
to. But perhaps even more importantly, it disregards established law from the
highest authority on down that legal conclusions are an integral part of the federal
notice pleading regime . . . .163
Judge Shadur’s point concerning legal conclusions is distinct from the well-known
Iqbal and Twombly issues.164 Together, Iqbal and Twombly make clear that a
plaintiff’s allegations may not be purely conclusory. A car crash plaintiff may not
simply plead that the defendant was negligent. The plaintiff must plead “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”165 However, along with those
facts, the plaintiff may plead legal conclusions.
Colorado’s insurance defense mill lawyers fall into Judge Shadur’s category of
“regular offender” with their answers to allegations that include legal conclusions. A
good example of the nearly one-third of answers that include such a claim is defense
attorney Andrew LaFontaine, Esq., of the firm of Stuart S. Jorgensen & Associates, in
his answer in a simple, one-plaintiff, one-defendant car crash claim.166 Jorgensen &
Associates are employees of State Farm Insurance and defend State Farm insureds.167
160 See Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VII.B, VIII.B, and IX.B.
161 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
163 State Farm, 199 F.R.D. at 278.
164 See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (discussing federal pleading
requirements); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (discussing federal pleading
requirements).
165 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
166 Answer and Jury Demand at 1, para. 5, Witman v. Kraus, No. 2015CV30800 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. May 28, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Witman Answer].
167 Stuart Jorgensen & Associates: State Farm Insurance, BUZZFILE,
http://www.buzzfile.com/business/State-Farm-Insurance-303-657-2078
[https://perma.cc/3ZGQ-RN9K]. The Rules of Professional Conduct require firms in which the
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Jorgensen & Associates answered 6.8% (25 of the 356) complaints in this study’s
sample. In response to one plaintiff’s allegation that “[j]urisdiction and venue are
appropriate pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-1-124 and C.R.C.P., Rule 98(c)(5),” Mr.
LaFontaine answered: “[c]alls for a legal conclusion.”168 This response has no
meaning or utility even to Mr. LaFontaine. The defense mill attorney then stated that
“[j]urisdiction and venue are not presently disputed.”169 That being so, why comment
on the legal conclusion? For good measure, Mr. LaFontaine then added “[d]enied in
all other respects.”170 But there’s nothing left to deny. Mr. LaFontaine might have
simply answered “Admit” in response to the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdiction and
venue.
Other insurance defense mill lawyers offer more extensive objections to the
pleading of legal conclusions. Nina Hammon Jahn, Esq., is a senior trial attorney for
American Family Insurance.171 Like the attorneys at Jorgensen & Associates, Ms. Jahn
is an employee of the insurer—an in-house attorney for American Family.172 Her
answer includes her email address using the amfam.com domain.173 Her office
answered 4.9% of this study’s complaints. There is no pretense, as with the firm name
Stuart S. Jorgensen & Associates, to being anything other than an insurance defense
mill lawyer. In her three-page answer to a relatively simple four-page complaint
against two defendants, Ms. Jahn amply refuses to respond to allegations that she
identifies as including legal conclusions.174 In her answer, which she filed on behalf
of a driver for a transport firm, Ms. Jahn states that “[w]ith regard to paragraphs 4, 5,
8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26 and 27 of the Plaintiff’s Complaint,
Defendant does not respond as the allegations contained in these paragraphs calls [sic]

insurance defense lawyers are employees of the insurers to be clear about their “captive” status.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES & PETER R. JARVIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §
59.15 (4th ed. Supp. 2020-2) (“Although the majority of courts addressing the issue agree that
‘captive law firm’ arrangements are not per se improper, there is almost universal agreement
that the law firms may not hold themselves out as ‘normal’ law firms, but must indicate on their
letterhead and other professional designations that the lawyers practicing in the firm are
employees of the carrier, not partners or members of an independent law firm.”).
168 Witman Answer, supra note 166, at 1, para. 5; Complaint for Damages and Jury Demand
para. 5, at 1, Witman v. Kraus, No. 2015CV30800 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 5, 2015) (Denver Cnty.).
169 Witman Answer, supra note 166, at 1, para. 5.
170 Id.
171 Nina Hammon Jahn, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/nina-hammon-jahn2646a14a/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2021).
172 Id.
173 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Anthony v. Transport Oh, No. 2015CV30639
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (Boulder Cnty.), Filing ID No. 8016DD52BB577 [hereinafter
Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint].
174 Id. at 1, para. 4.
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for a conclusion of law.”175 The complaint included thirty-one allegations.176
American Family’s attorney refused to answer fifteen of them because the allegations
called, she claimed, for “a conclusion of law.”177 What is Ms. Jahn complaining
about?
American Family’s lawyer first objected to a simple allegation about venue.
Plaintiff alleged that “Venue is proper in Boulder County, the county of residence of
Defendant Transport Oh.”178 Ms. Jahn is correct that venue is a legal conclusion,
though she is incorrect that she need not respond to legal conclusions.179 Colorado
Rule of Civil Procedure 98(c)(1) specifies that “an action shall be tried in the county
in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the commencement of the
action.”180 The plaintiff therefore properly and crisply pleaded the residence of the
defendant transport company.181 Ms. Jahn regarded the entire allegation as tainted by
the legal conclusion of venue and simply ignored the factual allegation that “Transport
Oh” resided in Boulder County.182 By failing to deny that or any part of an allegation,
Ms. Jahn admitted the allegation, as Rule 8 makes clear that “[a]verments in a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of
damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading.”183 But one doubts
that the defense lawyer would agree that she had admitted anything.
Ms. Jahn next refused to answer the plaintiff’s allegation that “Jurisdiction is
proper in District Court, a court of general jurisdiction.”184 This is folly. A judge who
cared might take offense.
After refusing to respond to the legal conclusions that the plaintiff pleaded
regarding venue and subject matter jurisdiction, Ms. Jahn refused to respond to the
plaintiff’s paragraph eight that “[a]t all relevant times hereto, Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz was
operating the International [truck] in the course and scope of his employment and for
the benefit of his employer, Transport Oh.”185 Without using the legal words vicarious
liability nor the Latin words respondeat superior, the plaintiff’s attorney was properly
pleading facts sufficient to establish that the plaintiff was on the job when the crash
175 Id.
176 See generally Complaint and Jury Demand, Anthony, No. 2015CV30639 [hereinafter
Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand].
177 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
178 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, para. 4, at 1.
179 See supra text accompanying note 158.
180 COLO. R. CIV. P. 98(c)(1).
181 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 4.
182 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
183 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(d).
184 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4; Anthony
Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 5.
185 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 8.
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involving the International truck happened. As above, Ms. Jahn throws the “legal
conclusion” blanket over the entire allegation.186 She does not stop to admit, for
example, that the plaintiff worked for Transport Oh. But of course, what is an
allegation of employment if not a “legal conclusion?”
Ms. Jahn next objected to a trio of allegations that the plaintiff’s lawyer set forth
in an effort to establish the defendant driver’s negligence per se. First, the plaintiff’s
lawyer alleged that “[a]t the time of the collision, C.R.S. § 42-4-1008 was in full force
and effect.”187 Ms. Jahn refused to answer this allegation because, she claimed, it’s a
legal conclusion.188 Parsing the language, is the legal conclusion “at the time of the
collision,” “full force,” or full “effect”?
There was a legitimate basis on which Ms. Jahn might complain about the
plaintiff’s attempt to invoke section 1008 of the Motor Vehicle Code. Section 1008,
which is titled “following too closely,” specifies that “[t]he driver of a motor vehicle
shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent.”189 As I
teach my torts students, statutes that prescribe “reasonable” behavior are not
candidates for plaintiffs’ lawyers pleading negligence per se.190 A panel of Colorado’s
Court of Appeals had made this exact point with regard to section 1008 just four
months before Ms. Jahn filed her answer. For the court of appeals, Judge Hawthorne
held that “[w]here, as with sections 42-4-1008 and 42-4-1101, the statutory standard
of care codifies common law negligence, a negligence per se instruction is redundant
when given alongside a common law negligence instruction.”191 The attorney for the
plaintiff had been careless, in my view, in pleading a statute that prescribed
“reasonable” conduct in order to establish negligence per se. Rather than take
advantage of this pleading error, the defense mill attorney simply refused to respond
to an allegation she (or perhaps her paralegal) saw as calling for a legal conclusion.
Ms. Jahn next refused to respond at all to allegations that included facts the
plaintiff’s lawyer presented in order to prove, however misguidedly, the elements of
negligence per se.192 The plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded that the driver of the International
truck had “breached the duty of care” that section 1008 imposed “by following [the
plaintiff] Mr. Anthony too closely so as to be unable to stop, by colliding into Mr.
Anthony, by failing to recognize and adjust for the speed of vehicles ahead, and by
failing to slow and stop for traffic stopped upon the roadway.”193 The defense mill
186 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
187 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 12. Other insurance
defense mill attorneys would avoid answering by claiming that the statute speaks for itself. See
infra Section III.C.
188 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
189 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1008(1) (1995).
190 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 100; JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS
82 (6th ed. 2018).
191 Winkler v. Shaffer, 356 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Colo. App. 2015).
192 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
193 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 14.
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attorney simply brushed away all these factual allegations because she spotted an
embedded legal conclusion that apparently tainted the entire allegation. Likewise, Ms.
Jahn refused to answer the next allegation, which stated that the plaintiff “was a
member of the class the statute was intended to protect, and suffered the type of harm
the statute was intended to prevent.”194
As should be becoming clear, the plaintiff’s claim was for having been rear-ended
by Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz, who was driving the International truck for Transport Oh.195
In Colorado, as elsewhere, the law presumes a driver who rear-ends another vehicle
to be at fault. Colorado’s jury instruction is:
When a driver of a motor vehicle hits another vehicle in the rear, the law
presumes [, and you must find,] that the driver was negligent.196
Ms. Jahn repeats the claim that a legal conclusion allows her not to answer another
four allegations related to a separate negligence per se claim.197 She refuses to admit
the existence of the statute, ignores facts the plaintiff alleges about the crash, and
refuses to admit either that the plaintiff or his injuries fell within the ambit of the
statute’s protection.198 Again, in my view, and I believe that of the court of appeals,
the plaintiff’s lawyer’s use of a statute concerning “following too closely”199 would
not support negligence per se.200 That does not mean, however, that Ms. Jahn was free
to ignore the pleaded facts as she did.
Continuing, American Family Insurance’s lawyer deploys the “calls for a legal
conclusion” claim an additional four times in her answer in order to avoid answering
the plaintiff’s allegations.201 In paragraph twenty-two, the plaintiff’s lawyer properly
pleaded that “[a]t all times relevant hereto, [Defendant] Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz had a
common law duty to act with reasonable care.”202 Ms. Jahn’s refusal to answer this
allegation is a good example of the silly wastefulness of the “calls for a conclusion of
law” claim.203 The allegation properly calls for a legal conclusion, and the simple
proposition that the defendant, while driving a truck, had a duty of reasonable care is

194 Id. at 3, para. 20; Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para.
4.
195 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 2, para. 10.
196 COLO. JURY INSTRS. FOR CIV. TRIALS 11:12 (bracketed text in original).
197 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
198 Id.
199 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1008 (1995).
200 Winkler v. Shaffer, 356 P.3d 1020, 1024 (Colo. App. 2015).
201 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
202 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 22.
203 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
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indisputable under Colorado law.204 Anyone driving a car has at least a duty of
reasonable care to others on the road; this is not even an interesting—let alone
disputable—issue.205 There is not only no basis under Rule 8 to refuse to respond to
this allegation asking the defendant to admit the existence of a duty of reasonable care,
there is no good faith legal argument against the existence of a duty.206
The insurance defense mill lawyer extends her refusal to answer because the
plaintiff alleges a legal conclusion following the allegation about duty. As noted, the
plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded negligence per se using two different Colorado statutes—
one for following too closely and the other for careless driving. Leaving aside the
unsuitability of those two statutes as a basis for negligence per se claims, the plaintiff’s
lawyer pleads the same factual predicates in his straight negligence claim.207 For my
students, I call this wearing suspenders and a belt—one pleads negligence together
with negligence per se in order to be sure that one’s pants stay up should either the
belt or suspenders fail.208 So, the lawyer pleaded that the defendant driver breached
his duty of care “by following Mr. Anthony too closely so as to be unable to stop, by
colliding into Mr. Anthony, by failing to recognize and adjust for the speed of vehicles
ahead, and by failing to slow and stop for traffic stopped upon the roadway.”209
Personally, I would have separated the factual claims into individual allegations. Ms.
Jahn answered by claiming that the allegation of the legal conclusion gave her license
to refuse to answer and thereby ignore the factual claims of the remainder of the
allegation.210
Continuing, the defense lawyer twice more spotted a call for a legal conclusion
and refused to answer the allegations at all.211 The plaintiff’s lawyer again sought to
establish vicarious liability and pleaded that “[a]t all relevant times, Jesus MalvaesOrtiz was acting in the course and scope of his employment and for the benefit of
Transport Oh.”212 This is nearly a word-for-word repetition of paragraph 8. “Acting in
the course and scope” does indeed call for a legal conclusion. For that matter, so does
the word “employment.” If there existed an actual factual dispute about whether the
driver was working for the company or on the job at the time of the crash, then of

204 Hesse v. McClintic, 176 P.3d 759, 762 (Colo. 2008) (“McClintic, like all drivers, was under
a duty to drive with reasonable care under the circumstances. This is the duty that attaches to
every driver when he or she goes on the road, and we have so held for almost half a century.”).
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 23.
208 See, e.g., ONCE UPON A TIME IN THE WEST (Paramount Pictures 1968) (“How can you trust
a man that wears both a belt and suspenders? Man can't even trust his own pants.” (Henry Fonda
as Frank)).
209 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 19.
210 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
211 Id.
212 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 3, para. 26.
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course the defense lawyer should object. In this instance, though, Ms. Jahn was doing
nothing more than being obstructive in claiming that the allegation called for a legal
conclusion that she need not answer. Likewise, in the next paragraph, the Plaintiff’s
lawyer pleaded that “Transport Oh, as master, bears liability for the acts of Jesus
Malvaes-Ortiz, its servant.”213 Plaintiff having sought a legal conclusion, the insurance
defense mill lawyer refused to answer just as she had for half of the allegations in the
complaint.214
Professor Engstrom identifies interview sources at the settlement mill law firms
using only initials to preserve their confidentiality, and she uses real initials only with
permission of the interviewees.215 This shrouds her articles in cloak-and-dagger
secrecy, as if she is concealing the identity of CIA assets. Professor Engstrom
discovered that settlement mill attorneys often were hesitant to speak with her, which
she attributed partially to their fear that they had violated professional standards.216 In
this piece, I do not hide or anonymize the names of the insurance defense mill lawyers
who sign their names to and file pleadings that often ignore the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure, that may also contravene the Colorado Rules of Professional
Conduct, and that ultimately, in my opinion, serve neither the interests of their clients
nor justice. Their answers are public records.217 If I had interviewed informants, I
adopt Professor Engstrom’s approach.
Ms. Jahn’s use of the “legal conclusion” canard is extreme and very tedious for
this Article’s gentle reader. Consider how much more tedious and aggravating
encountering such obstructive answers is for the plaintiff’s lawyer! The fundamental
purpose of complaints is to establish the facts and arguments that are in dispute.218
Defense obfuscation frustrates the purpose of pleading, increases the cost of litigation,
and slows resolution—which is the defense’s goal. This tactic serves the interest of
the insurance company. Insureds—who pay premiums in order to have the insurer
handle claims against them—might prefer a different approach.
More typical of the way insurance defense mill lawyers used the “legal conclusion”
shield in nearly one-third of their answers is the refuse/deny strategy. Aliseda &
Associates, on behalf of Fred Loya Insurance, answered 4.1% of the complaints in this

213 Id. at 3, para. 27.
214 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
215 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1488 n.13 (using initials to maintain
the anonymity of settlement mill attorneys who admitted to spending little time and effort on
the cases they resolved); Engstrom, Sunlight, supra note 14, at 810 (again, using initials to
maintain the anonymity of settlement mill attorneys who were expected to quickly settle cases).
216 Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1515.
217 See supra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
218 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 5 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1202,
Westlaw FPP (database updated April 2021) (“Historically, pleadings have served four major
functions: (1) giving notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) stating the facts each party
believes to exist; (3) narrowing the issues that must be litigated; and (4) providing a means for
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”).
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sample.219 Robert Holcomb, Esq., an Aliseda lawyer, has a pattern with regard to legal
conclusions. First, he notes that “Paragraph [__] of the Complaint contains a legal
conclusion to which no response is required.”220 Next, Mr. Holcomb states that “To
the extent a response is required, Defendant denies the allegations contained in
paragraph [__] of the Complaint.”221 He deployed this formulation in response to
allegations concerning mixed pleading of conclusions and law concerning jurisdiction,
venue, breach, and negligence per se in a rear-end crash lawsuit that Steven Zapiler,
Esq., filed.222 He uses this language in his other answers as well.223
The exact language that Mr. Holcomb uses in his refuse/deny responses is common
in answers. The Law Office of Chad A. Atkins, a Liberty Mutual Insurance defense
mill whose answers were 4.4% of the sample, responds: “The allegations contained in
paragraphs 17 and 22 of Plaintiff’s Complaint call for a legal conclusion and,
therefore, no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Defendant
denies the allegations.”224 The firm of Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison & Powers, P.C.,
responds to allegations that include a legal conclusion by answering “The allegations
contained in paragraph [__] of Plaintiffs’ Complaint seek a legal conclusion to which
Defendants are not required to respond. To the extent a response is necessary,
Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraph of Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”225
Harris, Karstaedt, a firm that defends on behalf of several different insurers, answered
2.2% of the complaints in the sample.226 Lasater & Martin uses nearly identical
language.227

219 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.
220 Answer and Jury Demand at 1, paras. 1–2, Gilady v. Rodriguez, No. 2015CV31311 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. June 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.).
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, paras. 19–20, Faris v. Rubio, No.
2015CV32115 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer and Jury Demand at 3,
paras. 22–25, LaMaster v. Lopez-Saucedo, No. 2015CV31948 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2015)
(Denver Cnty.); Answer and Jury Demand at 2, paras. 15, 17–18, Vargas v. VillaobosRodriguez, No. 2015CV31503 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 15, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.); Answer and Jury
Demand at 3, paras. 19–[23], Sanchez v. Johnson, No. 2015CV31337 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 18,
2015) (Denver Cnty.) (paragraph 23 misnumbered as 20).
224 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, para. 5, Lor v. Cano, No. 2015CV30992 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. Aug 3, 2015) (Adams Cnty.).
225 Defendants Clyde Coffman and Rocky Top Resources, Inc.’s Answer to Complaint by
Aaron Wedemeyer and Darin Wedemeyer and Request for Trial by Jury at 3, paras. 19–20, 25–
26, Wedemeyer v. Coffman, No. 2015CV31363 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.)
[hereinafter Wedemeyer Answer].
226 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.
227 Defendant Sergio Delarosa Moreno’s Answer and Jury Demand para. 8 at 2, Marshall v.
Moreno, No. 2015CV31358 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2015) (Denver Cnty.).
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Only one defense lawyer offers any explanation as to why he believes there is no
need to answer an allegation calling for a legal conclusion, and his explanation is
laughable. On behalf of Joseph Conway, a GEICO insured, Robert Ingram, Esq.,
answered.228 Mr. Ingram is an insurance mill defense lawyer who included a
geico.com email address on his answer.229 He works for Elizabeth A. Kleger &
Associates, which is in-house counsel for GEICO.230 The plaintiff’s lawyer, Chad
Hemmat, Esq., from Anderson, Hemmat & McQuinn, LLC, attempted to establish the
predicate for negligence per se by pleading both the existence of several statutes and
that these statutes were in effect at the time of the crash.231 Mr. Ingram answered that
“[w]ith respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the plaintiff’s
Complaint, they contain legal conclusions, which the Defendant Joseph A. Conway is
neither qualified, nor required to respond to.”232 There is a strange fiction in pleading,
in writing and responding to motions, and also in writing orders and opinions, in which
lawyers and judges write that “the Plaintiff” or “the Defendant” argues various points,
but of course the lawyers, not the parties, are the one doing the arguing. The plaintiff,
for example, never argues res ipsa loquitur; her lawyer does. In answering on behalf
of Mr. Conway, though, Mr. Ingram took that fiction a bit too far and forgot that
though his client was not qualified to respond, Mr. Ingram was. And, Rule 8 required
an answer.
Why the refuse/deny answer is aggravating may not be evident. Refusing to answer
because an allegation asks for a legal conclusion is, first, contrary to the rules. Second,
defense lawyers sometimes couple their refusal to answer with a declaration that, if
forced to answer, the allegation is denied. This answer is useless to the plaintiff unless
the judge forces the defense lawyer to answer, which will happen only if the plaintiff
files a motion with the court, awaits the defendant’s counsel response, and then files
a reply. Then, after some waiting, maybe the lawyers attend a hearing. All of this is
costly in money and time to everyone, plus judges get mad about this sort of thing.
The simplest solution is for defense attorneys to keep doing what they are doing
because they are getting away with it, or they could follow the rules and simply deny,
admit, or say that they have insufficient information on which to form a belief.
Defeating frivolous defenses takes considerable effort.
B.

Directed at Codefendant

Another tactic that the insurance defense mill lawyers learn after law school is to
not admit information concerning a defendant other than their client. No rule or
privilege authorizes this evasion.

228 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Baca v. Conway, No. 2015CV31119 (Colo.
Dist. Ct. May 5, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Baca Answer]. But see Answer to Amended
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Baca, No. 2015CV31119. Plaintiff later filed an amended
complaint to which a different attorney responded.
229 Baca Answer, supra note 228, at 1.
230 Id.
231 Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, paras. 13–15, Baca, No. 2015CV31119.
232 Baca Answer, supra note 228, at 2, para. 5.
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In 54 of the 356 answers, the insurance defense lawyers refused to answer
allegations because they claimed the plaintiffs directed the allegations at another
defendant. Of course, not every answer was to a complaint with multiple defendants.
One hundred twelve of the answers were in lawsuits that included multiple defendants.
The fifty-four refusals to respond to allegations directed at other defendants amounted
to 48.2% of all the answers in multidefendant cases. Regarding the slightly more than
half of answers that did not include a refusal to answer an allegation directed at a
codefendant, I did not code these complaints to determine whether there were
allegations directed at more than one defendant.
There is no basis in the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure for the refusal to reply
to an allegation because the insurance lawyer answering for a defendant believes that
the allegation was not directed at his or her client. Indeed, as noted above, Colorado’s
Rule 8 does not limit the allegations to which a defendant must respond to only those
“asserted against it.” This is a slight difference from the federal rule.233 Once again,
Rule 8(b) provides the option of admitting or denying.234 With regard to any allegation
about which an individual defendant has no knowledge, Rule 8(b) provides that the
defendant may say that he or she lacks sufficient information or knowledge to form a
belief.235 However, Rule 8(b) does not include the option of a defendant saying: “I
don’t think you directed your question at me, and so I will not answer even though I
may have sufficient information or knowledge to admit or deny.” If the plaintiff
alleges something about another defendant, then the answering defendant can admit,
deny, or say he or she does not know. Rule 8, as Judge Shadur noted, is simple.
Just as a defendant cannot refuse to respond to an allegation because the allegation
concerns another party, there is also no basis to refuse to answer if the allegation
concerns a nonparty.
Plaintiffs are entitled to use the complaint to explore what a defendant knows in
order to “narrow[] the issues that must be litigated” and to “provid[e] a means for
speedy disposition of sham claims and insubstantial defenses.”236 That’s the whole
idea! Any defendant may have information concerning what other people or
companies involved were doing. Of course, the plaintiff gets to explore that
information.
Smart plaintiffs’ lawyers properly use complaints to exploit conflicts between
defendants. A plaintiff’s lawyer who knows or suspects that one defendant knows
incriminating information about a codefendant should seek to gain admissions
concerning that information with the complaint. For example, one defendant may have
been driving a car while pulling on a bottle of Jack Daniels, and the second defendant
may have been riding shotgun and perhaps adding to the negligence by encouraging
the driver to speed. The lawyer for the plaintiff may of course expect both the driver
and the passenger to admit that the driver had been drinking Jack Daniels while
driving. The passenger does not get to squirm away from answering. Pitting the
defendants against each other is a basic and acceptable tactic in multiple-defendant

233 See supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text.
234 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
235 Id.
236 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 218, § 1202.
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cases. The plaintiff should not be put to the expense of written discovery or a
deposition to gain the passenger’s admission of this elementary detail.
A defense mill attorney’s use of the evasive claim that she or he need not answer
when the plaintiff’s lawyer directs an allegation at another person is puzzling at best
but more often infuriating. The lawsuit that emerged from a multivehicle crash on
December 17, 2012, offers a good example.237 Wayne Jacobs was a Colorado
Department of Corrections prisoner.238 Michael Klinger, a Department of Corrections
employee, was transporting Mr. Jacobs in a van.239 Juan Cardenas, an employee of
Superior Sheet Metals Corporation, crashed his employer’s 2004 International Truck
into a different driver’s 2000 Ford pickup, and then Mr. Klinger crashed the prison
van into the truck Mr. Cardenas was driving.240 The prisoner, Mr. Jacobs, sued Mr.
Cardenas, his employer Superior Sheet Metals, Mr. Klinger, and the Department of
Corrections.241
The law firm of Senter Goldfarb & Rice, LLC, filed the answer for Mr. Cardenas
and Superior Sheet Metals.242 Senter Goldfarb, which filed 2.5% of the answers in the
sample,243 deflected the allegations the prisoner’s attorney directed at the Department
of Corrections and its van driver. Why? Senter Goldfarb’s attorneys, Billy-George
Hertzke, Esq., and Jessica R. Schultz, Esq., answered that “[t]he allegations in
paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint are not directed at Defendants;
therefore, no response is required.”244 There being no law supporting their claim that
“no response is required,” the insurance defense mill attorneys cited no law. The
allegations they claimed not to have to answer included all the elements of the
plaintiff’s case against the codefendant. The plaintiff’s lawyer pleaded that Mr.
Klinger and the Department of Corrections had a duty “to operate the DOC vehicle in
a safe and prudent manner,” that Mr. Klinger failed to keep “an eye for problems
around him,” that Mr. Klinger “failed to slow down with due regard to traffic
conditions,” and that “he failed to keep a look out.”245 The allegations further claimed
that Mr. Klinger breached the duty of care and caused the plaintiff’s injuries.246 The

237 Complaint at 1, para. 1, Jacobs v. Superior Precision Sheet Metal Corp., No. 2015CV31295
(Colo. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.) [hereinafter Jacobs Complaint].
238 Id. at 1, para. 2.
239 Id. at 1, para. 3.
240 Id. at 2, paras. 4–6.
241 Id. at 1.
242 Answer of Defendants Micro Metals, Inc. and Juan Cardenas at 1, Jacobs, No.
2015CV31295, Filing ID No. 930145EB80411 [hereinafter Jacobs Answer].
243 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.
244 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 2, para. 6.
245 Jacobs Complaint, supra note 237, at 3, para. 16.
246 Id. at 3, para. 17.
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allegations then listed, in a very general way, some of the injuries.247 Instead of the
general denial of the plaintiff’s allegations against the codefendant, the Senter
Goldfarb attorneys might have used the answer to support the codefendant’s liability.
They might have simply admitted the undisputable matter of law that the Department
of Corrections driver had a duty of reasonable care, and Senter Goldfarb might also
have admitted Mr. Klinger’s breach of duty and that his breach of duty caused harm.
Denying the extent of the injuries perhaps made sense, as the insurance company that
paid Senter Goldfarb to defend the case might be on the hook for those damages.
However, admitting the codefendant’s duty, breach, and causation of damages could
have helped the insurance company that paid Senter Goldfarb to represent its insured.
Pointing the plaintiff toward the codefendant Department of Corrections would have
pointed the plaintiff away from Senter Goldfarb’s client.
After claiming no requirement that they answer an allegation directed at a
codefendant, the insurance defense mill lawyers of Senter Goldfarb heaped more
nonsense into their answer. The lawyers added this sentence: “To the extent that a
response is required, Defendants are without sufficient information and knowledge to
form a belief as to the truth and veracity of the allegations contained in paragraphs 16,
17, and 18 of Plaintiff’s Complaint.”248 There are at least three problems with this
sentence. First, Rule 8 requires a response. Second, if the defendants truly were
without “sufficient information and knowledge,” then Colorado Rule 8(b) makes clear
that the lawyer need only say so. Honestly, why answer with “we do not have to
answer, but if we did we know nothing?”249 Third, one doubts that the insurance
defense mill lawyers had so little information.250 The crash happened in December
2012.251 The plaintiff’s lawyers filed the complaint on May 6, 2015, and the insurance
defense mill lawyers filed their answer more than two months later on July 14,
2015.252 As I will discuss below, insurance claim agents investigate crashes and
compile claim investigation files.253 The insurance defense mill lawyers answered
more than two and a half years after the accident. If we are to believe the defense
firm’s answer, the insurance company’s claim representatives found no facts—no
“sufficient information and knowledge”—that would allow the Senter Goldfarb
attorneys to admit the “truth and veracity” of a single fact among those the plaintiff’s
lawyers alleged regarding the Department of Corrections and its officer.

247 Id. at 3, para. 18.
248 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 2, para. 6.
249 Hogan’s Heroes (CBS Prods. 1965–1971) (“I know nothing!” (John Banner as Sergeant
Hans Schultz)).
250 Fourth, “truth and veracity” is redundant. COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b) refers to “the truth of an
averment” not “truth and veracity.” See id. (“If he is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state and this has the effect
of a denial.”).
251 Jacobs Answer, supra note 242, at 1, para. 1.
252 Id. at 4; Jacobs Complaint, supra note 237, at 1.
253 See infra Section III.D.
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Additional examples of insurance defense mill lawyers refusing to answer
allegations about codefendants abound. A four-car collision from June 2014 provides
more.254 The plaintiff, Aracely Wineman-Warehime was driving in afternoon traffic
on West Sixth Avenue in Denver.255 She stopped. The defendant Suan Bonine rearended Ms. Wineman-Warehime and pushed her car into the car in front.256 Then,
predictably, Vernon Anderson rear-ended Ms. Bonine, which pushed Ms. Bonine’s
car again into the plaintiff’s car, which then crashed again into the car ahead: a fourcar collision with two vehicles rear-ending the cars just in front.257 This is not rocket
science; it’s bumper cars.
Two lawyers from Franklin D. Azar and Associates, P.C., filed the lawsuit on
behalf of Ms. Wineman-Warehime.258 Frank Azar, Esq., is among the television
advertisers whom Professor Engstrom characterizes as a “settlement mill lawyer,”
although this case makes clear his firm files lawsuits and does not rely on settlements
alone.259 The Azar and Associates lawyers presented negligence and negligence per
se claims against the two defendants.260 For Ms. Bonine, the driver who rear-ended
the plaintiff Ms. Wineman-Warehime, Janet Spies, Esq., answered.261 Ms. Spies’s
firm, Spies, Powers & Robinson, P.C., filed 1.6% of the answers in the sample.262
Helpfully, Ms. Spies admits in the answer that her client rear-ended the plaintiff—
“admits that the front of the vehicle she was driving collided with the rear of the
vehicle being driven by the Plaintiff”—and also that Mr. Anderson “struck from

254 Complaint at 2, para. 7, Wineman-Warehime v. Bonine, No. 2015CV32084 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. June 11, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Wineman-Warehime Complaint].
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at 1.
259 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1497 n.47 (“Frank Azar &
Associates fulfilled most settlement mill factors. First, the firm operated in extremely high
volumes, handling about 3,000 claims a year . . . . Second, the firm engaged in aggressive ‘in
your face’ television advertising . . . . Like other settlement mills, the firm only ‘[v]ery, very
rarely’ got referrals from other law firms or lawyers . . . . Third, in typical cases, Azar had a
routinized claim settlement process characterized by a number of discrete steps or ‘phases.’”
(internal citation omitted)); id. at 1496–97 (“At Frank Azar & Associates, described in the press
as ‘Denver’s best-known personal injury law practice,’ it appears that trials were conducted to
resolve only about 0.3% of claims.”); id. at 1527 (“At Azar & Associates, cases ‘often’ settled
for as little as $2,000.”).
260 Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 254, at 2, para. 7.
261 Defendant Suan Bonine’s Answer and Jury Demand at 1, Wineman-Warehime v. Bonine,
No. 2015CV32084 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 6, 2015) (Denver Cnty.), Filing ID No.
7D45C5F6277C0 [hereinafter Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint].
262 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.
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behind” Ms. Bonine’s vehicle, which then hit the plaintiff’s car again.263 However,
Ms. Spies eschews the opportunity to pile on Mr. Anderson and instead answers
allegations directed at him by stating seven different times that the allegations “are not
directed against this Defendant and therefore require no response.”264 Again, Rule 8(b)
disallows this response, and although admission of claims of negligence against a
codefendant might be of little marginal value, such admissions would be at least
slightly more valuable than no answer at all; plus, of course, actually answering would
comport with the Rules.
Mr. Anderson’s lawyer, Matthew Baukol, Esq., filed an even less helpful
answer.265 Mr. Baukol admitted only that his client was an individual who resided in
Colorado, that the incident took place in Denver, and that Denver County District
Court had jurisdiction and was the right venue.266 Mr. Baukol denied everything else
in the complaint or claimed to lack sufficient information and therefore denied the
allegations.267 As with Ms. Spies, his solidarity with codefendants overcame any
strategic advantage he might have gained by aligning against the codefendant; he
denied all the allegations against his client’s codefendant, Ms. Bonine.268 Where Ms.
Spies had agreed that both defendants rear-ended the cars in front of them, Mr. Baukol
found nothing to agree with in the narrative that the Azar lawyers included in the
complaint:269
On or about June 25, 2014 at approximately 3:49 p.m., Plaintiff was traveling
eastbound on West 6th Avenue and came to a stop in traffic. Defendant
Bonine was traveling eastbound on West 6th Avenue as well, behind Plaintiff.
Defendant Bonine struck the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle, pushing Plaintiff’s
vehicle into the vehicle in front of her. After this collision occurred,
Defendant Bonine was struck by a fourth vehicle driven by Defendant
Vernon Anderson, which pushed Defendant Bonine into Plaintiff’s vehicle a

263 Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 261, at 2, para. 10.
264 Id. at 2–3, paras. 11–12, 20–24.
265 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Wineman-Warehime, No. 2015CV32084,
Filing ID No. 1066A9A627EA6 [hereinafter Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime
Complaint].
266 Id. at 1, para. 1.
267 Id. at 1, paras. 2–3, 5, 7, 10. Denying an allegation for which a defense lawyer has
insufficient information to admit or deny makes no sense as a matter of logic. As Judge Shadur
asked: “how can a party disclaim knowledge or information even to form a belief as to the truth
of an allegation and then go on to deny it?” Webb v. Medicredit, Inc., No. 16-C-11125, 2017
WL 74854, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2017). See Russell, supra note 141, at 940, 947, 949; id. at
144 (“Judge Shadur’s colleagues in the Northern District of Illinois also cited the appendix when
confronting defendants’ formulaic claims regarding their lack of knowledge of information.”).
268 Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 265, at 1, para. 3.
269 Id. at 1, para. 2.
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second time. This second impact pushed Plaintiff’s vehicle into the vehicle
in front of her a second time as well.270
Rule 8(b) states that “[w]hen a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material
and shall deny only the remainder.”271 Ms. Spies parsed this paragraph, agreed that
her client had rear-ended the plaintiff, agreed that Mr. Baukol’s client had rear-ended
her own client, and agreed that there were secondary collisions.272 By contrast, Mr.
Baukol denied the entire paragraph; not even the date, time, or location were “true and
material.”273
Azar and Associates received a similar insurance defense mill runaround in a suit
the firm filed in June 2015 on behalf of Jose Reyes.274 The Azar firm’s clever first
allegation in the amended complaint’s first claim for relief lays out the needed facts to
understand this story of negligence:
On or about September 16, 2013 at approximately 10:35 a.m., Plaintiff Jose
Reyes was injured when Defendant Tony Zulu's motor vehicle, a 2005 Ford
Crown Victoria, (taxi cab) when Defendant [sic] drove into the living room
of the Plaintiff. The accident took place at the private property at 245 N. Sable
Blvd., Unit 9105, Aurora, Colorado in Arapahoe County, Colorado.275
On behalf of Reyes, Azar and Associates filed suit against the taxi driver, Tony
Zulu; the company for which Mr. Zulu drove, Metro Taxi; and also against Mr. Zulu’s
uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage carrier alleging that the carrier had failed
to pay benefits to which Mr. Zulu was entitled.276
Torts professors and civil procedure professors might expect the codefendants to
deny their own liability but point the finger of blame at each other in order to reduce
their own liability; that’s not at all what happened. White and Steele, P.C., which filed
3.0% of the answers in the sample,277 represented the uninsured/underinsured motorist
carrier Ameriprise Auto & Home Insurance.278 For the insurer, White and Steele
admitted only four of the twenty-four paragraphs in the Azar firm’s complaint—the

270 Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 254, at 2, para. 7.
271 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
272 Bonnie Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 261, at 1–2, para. 7.
273 Anderson Answer to Wineman-Warehime Complaint, supra note 265, at 1, para. 2.
274 Amended Complaint at 1, Reyes v. Zulu, No. 2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 13, 2016)
(Arapahoe Cnty.) [hereinafter Reyes Amended Complaint].
275 Id. at 2, para 6.
276 Id. at 4, para. 24; see infra p. 71 (explaining UM/UIM cases).
277 See supra text accompanying notes 136137.
278 Defendant, IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company d/b/a Ameriprise Auto & Home
Insurance, Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Reyes, No. 2015CV31509, Filing ID
No. C04CC0C3B0939 [hereinafter Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins. Answer, Reyes].
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insurance firm’s name and address, that venue in Arapahoe County was proper, that
Reyes had an Ameriprise policy with coverage of $100,000 per person and $300,000
per accident, and that Mr. Reyes was an “insured person” under the policy entitled to
uninsured motorist benefits.279 One way or another, White and Steele denied or refused
to answer all the other Azar allegations. Twelve different times, White and Steele’s
answer intones:
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph [__] of the Complaint,
these allegations are not directed to this defendant. As such, no responsive
pleading is required by this defendant. To the extent that any allegations
contained therein may be construed to be asserted against this defendant, the
allegation shall be taken as denied or avoided.280
Leaving aside what the passive formulation “taken as denied or avoided” even
means, White and Steele deployed the “not directed to this defendant” gambit to avoid
commenting on the factual allegations that describe Mr. Zulu crashing his Crown Vic
taxi into Mr. Reyes’s living room.281 The insurance defense mill lawyers avoided
admitting or denying the date, time, place, driver’s name, type of car, fact that the car
was a cab, name of the cab company, property address, and whether the car crashed
into the living room.282 Likewise, though, the insurance defense mill lawyers at White
and Steele also claimed their insurance company client was “without sufficient
information” to admit that Reyes was “an individual and resident of the State of
Colorado,” even though he was their insured!283
Azar and Associates fared little better in inducing the other codefendants to blame
someone else. Just as the insurance defense mill lawyers representing the insurance
company might have wanted to blame the comparatively deep-pocketed cab company
or the perhaps judgement-proof cab driver, so too did the defense lawyers representing
the driver have every incentive to blame their codefendants. Instead, Mr. Zulu’s
lawyer, Nick Herrick, Esq., of the firm of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman, LLP,
eleven times chanted that “[a]nswering Paragraph[s 14–24], Plaintiff’s [Third or
Fourth] Claim for Relief is not alleged against Tony Zulu and, therefore, does not
require a response.”284 For good measure, Mr. Herrick also claimed that five

279 Id. at 2–3, paras 4–5, 19–20.
280 Id. at 2–3, paras. 6–17.
281 Id. The Azar firm is a dominant television advertiser in the Denver metro area, with Azar
(who is a graduate of the law school where the author teaches) calling himself “The Strong
Arm.” As is typical of urban American television markets, Azar advertises heavily on daytime
television. Frank Azar, I Am Frank Azar, YOUTUBE (Sept. 18, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN7lmqTLT8s. Perhaps, when Zulu crashed into Reyes’s
living room at 10:35 a.m., one of Azar’s ads was running on the television.
282 Ameriprise Auto & Home Ins. Answer, Reyes, supra note 278, at 2, para. 6.
283 Id. para. 1, at 1; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para. 1.
284 Defendant Tony Zulu’s Answer to Amended Complaint at 2–3, paras. 14–17, 19–24, Reyes
v. Zulu, No. 2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 1, 2016) (Arapahoe Cnty.), Filing ID No.
BB3C37E263A9E [hereinafter Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint].
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allegations “call for a legal conclusion and therefore do not merit or require a
response.”285
For fifteen of the complaint’s twenty-four paragraphs, Mr. Herrick ignored the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and refused to answer.286 All that he admitted was
that Mr. Zulu was “an individual and resident of the State of Colorado,” that venue in
Arapahoe County was proper, and that Mr. Zulu was driving a 2005 Ford Crown
Victoria and was involved in an accident at 245 North Sable Blvd.287 Mr. Herrick
simply ignored the date and time of the accident, the fact that the Crown Vic was a
taxi, and the room in which the crash occurred.
The cab driver’s insurance defense mill lawyer refused to admit very basic facts
that his client surely knew and that would have helped his client. Such refusal violates
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure and likely also the Colorado Rules of
Professional Conduct in my opinion. For example, the Azar firm lawyers pleaded that
codefendant “MKBS LLC has Metro Taxi as a trade name.”288 Denver cab drivers at
the time signed leases as independent contractors with area cab companies, and Mr.
Zulu would have of course been familiar with MKBS, LLC, as the entity that operated
Metro Taxi.289 Even so, Mr. Zulu’s lawyers claimed insufficient information and so
denied the allegation that MKBS, LLC, operated Metro Taxi.290 Similarly, Mr. Zulu’s
lawyers denied that their client was “the employee or agent of Defendant MKBS, LLC,
and was acting within the scope of his employment and authority . . . .”291 A truthful
answer consistent with Rule 8 might have denied that the cab driver was an employee
but admitted that as an independent contractor he acted within the scope of his
authority vis à vis Metro Taxi. Such an admission would likely have benefitted Mr.
Zulu by bringing him within the scope of Metro Taxi’s insurance coverage. Almost
certainly, Mr. Zulu’s Crown Vic was painted in Metro Taxi colors, with the company
name and phone number on the vehicle. Playing cat-and-mouse with that admission
was untruthful and did not help Mr. Zulu.
Lastly, Azar and Associates fared no better with the answer of the third
codefendant, MKBS, LLC, which operated Metro Taxi. Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison &

285 Id. at 2, paras. 7–8, 10–12.
286 Id. at 2–3, paras. 7–8, 10–12, 14–17, 19–24.
287 Id. at 1–2, paras. 2, 5–6; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1–2, paras. 2, 5–6.
288 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para 3.
289 In re Application of MKBS, LLC, 11L-374CP, 2011 WL 5100577, at *1 (Colo. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n Apr. 27, 2011) (commission order granting tariff changes) (“Metro Taxi states: [its]
drivers are independent contractors . . . .” (alteration in original)).
290 Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 284, at 2, para. 3; Reyes Amended Complaint,
supra note 274, at 1, para. 3.
291 Zulu Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 284, at 2, para. 14; Reyes Amended
Complaint, supra note 274, at 2, para. 14.
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Powers, P.C., admitted two allegations.292 First, the firm admitted that MKBS, LLC,
was “a limited liability company in good standing, authorized to do business in the
State of Colorado and operate[d] in Aurora, Colorado.”293 Second, the firm admitted
the venue was proper in Arapahoe County.294 The insurance defense mill lawyers
pleaded nine times that “paragraph [__] does not contain allegations against this
Defendant and, therefore no response is required. If any portion of paragraph [__] is
intended or considered to contain an allegation against this Defendant[,] it is
denied.”295 The firm also denied seven paragraphs and claimed there was insufficient
knowledge to answer several others.296 Regarding paragraph six, which alleged that
one morning in September 2013, a Metro Taxi Crown Vic crashed into the plaintiff’s
living room, Metro Taxi’s lawyers denied the entire paragraph.297 Rule 8(b) expects
that “[w]hen a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or a qualification of an
averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny only the
remainder.”298 Harris, Karstaedt specified nothing as true and answered Reyes’s
complaint with a response that effectively meant “none of this happened.”299
Mr. Reyes, who apparently injured his hip rushing from the bathroom after the
crash, sued three codefendants.300 Together, these three codefendants claimed thirtyone different times that they could refuse to answer allegations directed at another
codefendant. The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure require an admission or a denial.
The codefendants’ evasion advanced nothing at all. Perhaps this sort of nonsense is
fun to file, but is this variant of the practice of law what we call professional?
The final illustration of insurance defense mill lawyers’ use of the “not my client,
so I don’t have to answer” response returns to Ms. Jahn. As noted above, Ms. Jahn
deployed the “calls for a legal conclusion” response to nearly half of a complaint filed
in a rear-end collision case.301 The American Family Insurance in-house lawyer also
used the “not my defendant” claim when answering. Ms. Jahn represented both

292 Defendant MKBS, LLC’s Answer to Amended Complaint at 1, para. 2, Reyes v. Zulu, No.
2015CV31509 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2016) (Arapahoe Cnty.), Filing ID No.
66839F3D54C78 [hereinafter MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint].
293 Id.; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1 para. 3.
294 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1, para. 5; MKBS Answer to Reyes
Complaint, supra note 292, at 1, para. 2.
295 MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 292, at 1–2, paras. 4, 6, 11.
296 Id. at 1–2, paras. 1, 3, 7, 9.
297 Id. at 1, para. 3; Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 2, para. 6.
298 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
299 MKBS Answer to Reyes Complaint, supra note 292, at 1, para. 3.
300 Reyes Amended Complaint, supra note 274, at 1.
301 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 4.
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codefendants in a case—the driver of the truck and his employer.302 In Colorado, with
sufficient advisement and disclosure, a single attorney may represent codefendants
between whom there may be a conflict of interest.303 Evan Banker, Esq., includes as
paragraph three of his complaint that “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant Jesus
Malvaes-Ortiz is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Arapahoe County,
Colorado.”304 Ms. Jahn, in answering for Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz, admitted the
allegation.305 However, in answering for Mr. Malvaes-Ortiz’s employer, she stated
that “Defendant does not respond to the allegations contained in paragraph 3 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint as they appear to be directed at another party.”306 That is, she
admitted the allegation in one answer but refused to answer the same allegation in the
other. In fairness, she filed the company’s answer before she filed the driver’s answer,
and perhaps she only learned that the driver was a U.S. citizen and an Arapahoe
County resident after she answered on behalf of his employer. But wouldn’t his
employer have been able to admit that information? Indeed, although the allegation is
about the driver, the plaintiff’s lawyer did not specifically direct it at either defendant.
He did not, for example, include it within a claim for relief directed at one or the other
defendant. Evading the response by claiming not to have to answer makes the
employer appear to be hiding something. The insurance defense mill lawyer’s
reflexive, determined insistence on not answering thus does just a bit of harm to one
of her clients. Plus, being able to answer an allegation for one client but not being
willing to answer for another is weird.
Nothing about Colorado’s Rule 8 allows a defense attorney to avoid answering
when the plaintiff’s lawyer has directed an allegation at a codefendant, a non-party at
fault, or another person. Federal Rule 8 directs that the “party must . . . admit or deny
the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party”307 Perhaps the phrase
“asserted against it” allows codefendants in federal lawsuits to not answer claims
against codefendants.308 However, Colorado’s Rule 8 does not limit the allegations to
which a defendant must respond to only those “asserted against it.”309 The plain text

302 Id. at 1; Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Anthony v. Transport Oh, No.
2015CV30639M (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 5, 2015) (Boulder Cnty.), Filing ID No.
9AE3D70546562 [hereinafter Transportation Oh Answer to Anthony Complaint].
303 COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 1.7(b).
304 Anthony Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 176, at 1, para. 3.
305 Malvaes-Ortiz Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 173, at 1, para. 1.
306 Transportation Oh Answer to Anthony Complaint, supra note 302, at 1, para. 3.
307 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
308 Judge Shadur did not allow lawyers to refuse to answer allegations against codefendants.
Faced with lawyers who answered on behalf of three codefendants but who cagily refused to
admit what any single defendant knew about the others, Judge Shadur ordered the lawyers to
file a consolidated reply shorn of evasions. Azza Int’l Corp. v. Gas Rsch. Inst., 204 F.R.D. 109,
110 (N.D. Ill. 2001). Russell, supra note 141, at 938.
309 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
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of Colorado’s Rules of Civil Procedure directs the defendant to “admit or deny the
averments of the adverse party.”310
As with refusals to answer when the defending attorney spots a call for a legal
conclusion, the proper path for Colorado defense counsel facing an allegation directed
at a codefendant is to admit or deny. For plaintiffs’ attorneys, the evasion is
maddening. Justice does not advance. Furthermore, defendants, that is, the insureds,
should also want answers to develop information concerning the culpability of
codefendants who ought to share in the liability. Insurance defense mill lawyers would
better serve both the liability insurers and their own clients if they admit information
that points to another party for whom a different insurance carrier will have to pay.
C. Document Speaks for Itself
As with legal conclusions and allegations concerning codefendants, insurance
defense lawyers also evade Rule 8’s clear path when plaintiffs’ attorneys refer in
complaints to documents or statutes. Insurance defense settlement lawyers typically
claim that the “document speaks for itself.”311
Documents never spoke to Judge Shadur during his lifetime. He explained that
“[a]nother unacceptable device, used by lawyers who would prefer not to admit
something that is alleged about a document in a complaint (or who may perhaps be
too lazy to craft an appropriate response to such an allegation), is to say instead that
the document ‘speaks for itself.’”312 Reviewing his years on the bench, Judge Shadur
revealed that “[t]his Court has been attempting to listen to such written materials for
years (in the forlorn hope that one will indeed give voice)—but until some such writing
does break its silence,” he continued, “this Court will continue to require pleaders to
employ one of the three alternatives that are permitted by Rule 8(b) in response to all
allegations about the contents of documents (or statutes or regulations).”313
Colorado insurance defense mill lawyers claim that rules, statutes, and documents
speak. For example, one firm’s attorney responds to allegations concerning venue by
reciting that “[t]o the extent a response is required, Defendant states that C.R.C.P.
98(c) speaks for itself.”314 In none of the answers from this firm—a bit-player that
answered just 1.4% of the cases in the sample—did the firm’s lawyer actually admit
that the district court in which the plaintiff had filed was the proper venue.315 The

310 Id.
311 Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VII.A., VIII.A., IX.A.
312 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riley, 199 F.R.D. 276, 279 (N.D. Ill. 2001).
313 Id.
314 Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand at 1, para. 3, Vivar v. Cedillo-Macias, No.
2015CV30042 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 27, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Vivar Answer].
315 Id.; Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 1, para. 2,
Roybal v. Barbosa, No. 2015CV30311 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 8, 2015) (Weld Cnty.); Answer,
Defenses and Jury Demand at 1, para. 3, Byrne v. Hogue, No. 2015CV30028 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
July 8, 2015) (Lake Cnty.); Defendant Jeffery Jefferson’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint at 1, para. 2, Vallejos v. Gallegos, No. 2015CV30020 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 29, 2016)
(Huerfano Cnty.), Filing ID No. 5CAAB010EBE4E; Answer, Defenses and Jury Demand at 1,
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defense lawyer’s repeated practice is to respond to allegations concerning venue by
first refusing to answer conclusions of law and then by stating the rule speaks for itself:
The allegations set forth in the second paragraph 3 and paragraph 4 of
Plaintiff’s Complaint concern venue, which are conclusions of law to which
this Defendant can neither admit nor deny. To the extent a response is
required, Defendant states that C.R.C.P. 98 speaks for itself.316
The lawyer claims, contra Colorado Rule 8(b), that his client “can neither admit
nor deny” a conclusion of law and then wraps that misstatement in a contingent claim
that Rule 98 speaks though the defendant cannot. This lawyer does not merely say that
the legal conclusions require no response but that his client, the defendant, cannot
admit or deny them.
Insurance defense mill lawyers also give voice to statutes in the same way. The
same lawyer whose clients cannot admit or deny a legal conclusion notes in response
to the defendant’s allegation of parts of title 42 of the Colorado Motor Vehicle Code,
that “C.R.S. 42-4-1401, 42-4-1402, and 42-4-1101 speak for themselves.”317 Bruce
Shibles, Esq., an in-house attorney for Farmers Insurance, simply notes that the
defendant “also states that any statute cited in Plaintiff’s Complaint speaks for
itself.”318 This broad brush tactic, which contravenes the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure, is characteristic of insurance defense mill lawyers. Rather than the lawyer
or paralegal responding to each of the eight allegations that include a reference to the
Colorado Motor Vehicle Code,319 the answer brushes all these allegations away at
once, in addition to the reference to Rule 98320 and the state constitution.321
Other lawyers hedge a bit on just what the statutes have to say for themselves.
Take for example, Allstate employee Christopher R. Jones, Esq., who answers on
behalf of the in-house firm Temple & Associates. When faced with a statute, Mr. Jones
first cites the statute, which he then notes “speaks for itself.”322 Next, Mr. Jones hedges

para. 3, Smith v. Holmes, No. 2015CV30780 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.)
[hereinafter Smith Answer].
316 Smith Answer, supra note 315, at 1, para. 3.
317 Vivar Answer, supra note 314, at 2, para. 7.
318 Ewing’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, Jensen v. Ewing, No. 2015CV30096
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 24, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.).
319 Complaint paras. at 3–4, 22–29, Jensen, No. 2015CV30096.
320 Id. at 2, para 4.
321 Id. at 1, para. 3.
322 Defendant Kevin A. Cox’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, paras. 16–17, Clark v. Cox, No.
2015CV30048 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Clark Answer];
Defendant Alexander Yeros’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, para. 17, Moore v. Yeros, No.
2015CV30251 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Moore Answer];
Answer of Defendants Noah T. Depsky and Meghan Beaudion, Incorrectly Identified as Megan
Donohue in the Complaint, and Jury Demand at 2–3, paras. 14–16, Mainridge-King v. Depsky,
No. 2015CV30265 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.) [hereinafter Mainridge-King
Answer]; Defendant Gloria Basquez’s Answer and Jury Demand at 2, para. 16, Martinez v.
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his bet just a bit by adding that he “[d]enied to the extent the allegations are contrary
to, inconsistent with, or misstate” Colorado law.323 Together, he asserts that a statute
speaks for itself—means what it means—but then says that to the extent—an extent
that he leaves unexamined—that the plaintiff’s allegations misstate the law, he denies
them. That is, if the plaintiff means to say what the statute does not say when speaking
for itself, then Mr. Jones, attorney for the defendant, denies. Rule 8(b) does not
authorize this evasion.
Other insurance defense mill lawyers hedge the manner in which they avoid
answering differently by giving voice to statutes. The Harris, Karstaedt firm, for
example, deployed this language: “Defendant maintains that each cited statutory
authority or municipal ordinance speaks for itself or is subject to interpretation by the
court; therefore,” the firm’s attorneys claim, “these assertions of paragraph [__] are
not allegations to which a response is owed.”324 Put differently, the statute means what
it means, unless the judge says it means something else, but either way, defense
counsel will admit nothing about the statute.
Not only statutes, but also documents, speak for themselves, thereby inspiring
insurance defense mill lawyers to evade answering as Colorado Rule 8(b) requires. In
answering Elizabeth Nelson’s suit against Dillon Companies, the parent company of
the grocery chain King Soopers, Dina Bernardelli, Esq., claimed, in response to an
allegation, that “[t]he State of Colorado Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself and
does not require a response.”325 In the original complaint, Richard Kaudy, Esq., had
alleged that “as reflected by a State of Colorado Traffic Accident Report, Rhoades
failed to yield to the Elizabeth Nelson vehicle while making a left turn at the
intersection of Wadsworth Boulevard and Mississippi Avenue in the City of
Lakewood.”326 In a beautiful amended complaint, Mr. Kaudy added a scan of the
Traffic Accident Report, photos of the vehicles involved including damage to the
plaintiff’s car, copies of the King Soopers incident report, and other graphics
documenting his client’s claim.327 The insurance defense mill lawyer’s answer—that
the Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself—seems risky in light of Mr. Kaudy’s
factual allegations and other support. However, Ms. Bernardelli added that “[t]o the

Basquez, No. 2015CV30152 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 3, 2015) (Pueblo Cnty.) [hereinafter Martinez
Answer].
323 Clark Answer, supra note 322, at 2, paras. 16–17; Moore Answer, supra note 322, at 2,
para. 17; Mainridge-King Answer, supra note 322, at 2–3, paras. 14–16; Martinez Answer,
supra note 322, at 2, para. 16.
324 Answer of Earnest T. Prince to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, para. 13, Wiley v. StevenRoberts Originals, LLC., No. 2015CV31815 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.),
Filing ID No. 1020648B53936.
325 Answer and Jury Demand, at 2, para. 16, Nelson v. Dillon Cos., Inc., No. 2015CV30870
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 10, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.) [hereinafter Nelson Answer]; see supra notes
93–112 and accompanying text (providing information on how traffic accident reports are
compiled).
326 Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 15, Nelson, No. 2015CV30870.
327 Plaintiff Elizabeth Nelson Amended Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, 4–12, Nelson, No.
2015CV30870.
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extent a response is required, all allegations in Paragraph 15 are denied.”328 The
insurance defense mill lawyer’s message? The Traffic Accident Report speaks and
means what it means, but when the plaintiff’s lawyer repeats what the report says, the
defense denies everything.329
Ms. Bernardelli’s claim that the Traffic Accident Report speaks for itself is also
problematic considering the issue with KABCO data that I described above.330 A party
to a crash may tell the police officer that she is injured. If the injury the party claims
is not evident to the officer, the officer may record a 1 (though not a 0) in the Traffic
Accident Report. Later the Colorado Department of Transportation’s chief engineer
interprets that 1 as an injury, but the state epidemiologist who writes a report using
that data declares there was no injury. How has the Traffic Accident Report spoken
for itself?
When the police ticket a defendant after a crash, the plaintiff’s lawyers sometimes
make reference to that ticket in the complaint. Referring to the ticket leads to several
problems. In her answer for Clyde Coffman and Rocky Top Resources, Inc., Jane
Bendle Lucero, Esq., had to contend with the plaintiff’s allegation that the Colorado
State Patrol had given a ticket to Mr. Coffman after he rear-ended Aaron and Darin
Wedemeyer.331 Ms. Lucero admitted that the Colorado State Patrol came to the scene
of the “subject accident.”332 She then correctly noted that “[t]he remainder of the
allegations contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiff’s Complaint reference inadmissible
information and/or documentation.”333 Ms. Lucero then wrote that “Defendant states
that the referenced citation, inadmissible in this lawsuit, speaks for itself.”334 What a
tangle of language!
A simpler approach to the allegation of a traffic ticket exists. Benjamin Wegener,
Esq., then an associate at Younge & Hockensmith, P.C., in Grand Junction, Colorado,
and now the first named partner at Wegener Scarborough Younge & Hockensmith
LLP, responded differently to the plaintiff’s allegation of a ticket. Mr. Wegener simply
stated that “[w]ith regard to the allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs’
Complaint, Defendants admit only that Jackson was issued a citation for following too
closely, but deny that the same is relevant or admissible.”335 Ms. Lucero might have
tried this approach rather than awkwardly claiming that the ticket spoke for itself.

328 Nelson Answer, supra note 325, at 2, para. 16.
329 Id.
330 See supra text accompanying notes 96–104 (describing KABCO reporting methodology).
331 Complaint at 2, paras. 6, 13, Wedemeyer v. Coffman, No. 2015CV31363 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
May 12, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.).
332 Wedemeyer Answer, supra note 225, at 2, para. 13.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 13, McCormick
v. Jackson, No. 2015CV30055 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 27, 2015) (La Plata Cnty.).
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Both Ms. Lucero and Mr. Wegener are right that Colorado makes inadmissible a
traffic ticket that a party receives.336 Allstate’s attorney, Christopher Jones, Esq.,
simply includes a notation that “[r]eference to the citation received by Defendant is
inadmissible and should be stricken. See C.R.S. § 42-4-1713.”337 Too often, plaintiffs’
attorneys seem not to know that records of traffic-ticket convictions are inadmissible,
just as too often they cite violations of statutes that will not support negligence per se
or the breach of a statutory duty. Properly speaking, Rule 8(b) requires that the defense
attorney admit the ticket, as Mr. Wegener did. After that, noting the ticket’s
inadmissibility, rather than fussing with a Rule 12(f) motion to strike impertinent
material,338 is a perfectly acceptable approach to extinguishing the plaintiff’s
attorney’s improper tactic. Ms. Lucero’s alternative approach of simultaneously
claiming that the document speaks for itself but should not be admitted as evidence
weirdly both gives voice to and muzzles the ticket. As an insurance defense mill
attorney, Ms. Lucero reflexively claims that every document speaks for itself and
secondarily must clean up any document that speaks out of turn.
Most laughable are claims by two different insurance defense mill lawyers that
insurance policies spoke for themselves. In a suit against two insurers, Shelter
Insurance’s attorney answered three allegations this way: “Shelter asserts that the
applicable Shelter auto policy speaks for itself . . . .”339 Anyone who has ever read or
tried to read an insurance policy knows that no policy speaks for itself, and policies
do not even mean what they seem to mean. Furthermore, if policies spoke for
themselves, the need for lawyers and judges would be substantially less. Shelter’s
attorney, Sophia Tsai, Esq., tacked on another sentence after claiming the policy spoke
for itself: “Shelter denies any allegations of said paragraph that are inconsistent with
the terms of the policy.”340 Ms. Tsai gets the Rule 8(b) process of answering
complaints exactly backwards. She claims that the allegations may be factually
incorrect, and if so, the self-speaking insurance policy overrules the allegation.
However, her answers to these allegations do nothing at all to advance the truthseeking function and instead claim some other truth may exist within the policy.341

336 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1713 (2020) (“[N]o record of the conviction of any person for any
violation of this article shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.”).
337 Clark Answer, supra note 322, at 1, para. 4.
338 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(f) (“[T]he court may order any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter stricken from any pleading, motion, or other paper.”).
339 Answer and Jury Demand at 2–3, paras. 11–13, Snyder v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., No.
2015CV30096 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 23, 2015) (Broomfield Cnty.), Filing ID No.
34BF0AAA9D2BF.
340 Id.
341 Id. (“Shelter asserts that the applicable Shelter auto policy speaks for itself, and Shelter
denies any allegations of said paragraph that are inconsistent with the terms of the policy.”); see
also id. at 4, para. 11 (explaining that the Plaintiff is not the real party of interest); USAA’s
Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand, Austin v. USAA Cas. Ins., No.
2015CV30489 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 16, 2015) (Larimer Cnty.) [hereinafter Austin Answer]
(“USAA states that the policy speaks for itself.”).
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Forty-seven of the 356 answers included the nonanswer that a document spoke for
itself.342 This is 12.8% of the answers. Here again, I did not tally how many of the
complaints included allegations that referred to documents or statutes and thereby
created the opportunity for evasion using the claim that the document spoke for itself.
As Judge Shadur experienced during his own career on the federal bench in Illinois,
statutes and documents do not speak—especially not insurance policies. Insurance
defense mill attorneys should instead admit the existence of documents and statutes,
admit or deny their applicability, challenge their admissibility where obvious, and then
admit or deny the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ construction of those documents and statutes.
D. Inadequate Investigation
Rule 11 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure requires investigation.343 As is
well known, C.R.C.P. Rule 11 states that:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation.344
The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct also require investigation. Rule 3.1,
titled Meritorious Claims and Contentions, specifies that:
A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.345
Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 does allow that “[t]he filing of an action or defense or
similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first
been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only
by discovery.”346 No one expects discovery to precede answering. “What is required
of lawyers, however,” the comment explains, “is that they inform themselves about
the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that they can
make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.”347 As with Rule 11,
Rule 3.1 puts investigation at the representation’s core. 348

342 See supra text accompanying notes 136–137.
343 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
344 Id.
345 COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 3.1.
346 COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 3.1 cmt. 2.
347 Id.
348 Id. Comment 2 further notes that:
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Car crash cases are the model personal injury lawsuit.349 Roughly seven out of
eight of Colorado’s drivers have car insurance.350 When cars crash and there is an
injury, the drivers call their insurance companies.
After learning of car crashes, liability insurers investigate. Car insurance
companies are obliged to investigate and generally do so.351 An investigator opens a
file, collects accident reports and other documents, takes a statement from the insured,
calls other witnesses, and assembles a file called the claim file.352 This process is so
routine that there are checklists.353
When lawyers become involved as counsel for injured persons, they contact and
negotiate with the other driver’s insurance company. If, for whatever reason, there is
not already an open claim file before a lawyer contacts the insurer, then the auto
liability insurer will open such a file immediately upon contact by the plaintiff’s
lawyer.354
All but one of the answers filed in the sample shows evidence of the involvement
of an insurance company. There are only four pro se defendants in the sample.355
Such action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the
client’s position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous,
however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith argument on
the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
Id.; see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 11.
349 See Engstrom, When Cars Crash, supra note 47, at 295 (quoting scholars who have
observed that automobile claims are the paradigm for individualized dispute resolution in the
tort system).
350 Estimated Percentage of Uninsured Motorists by State - 2015, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/table-archive/20641 [https://perma.cc/UVQ8-AFKJ].
351 COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(h)(III) (2020) defines “[f]ailing to adopt and implement
reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims arising under insurance policies” as
among an array of “[u]nfair claim settlement practices.” Burgess v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 841
P.2d 325, 328–29 (Colo. App. 1992).
352 ROSS, supra note 41, at 87–96; Michael E. Brown & Jeffery A. Doty, Strategies for Counsel
for the Insurer—Investigation of the Automobile Loss, 4 LAW AND PRACTICE OF INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 51:8 (June 2020) (stating that typically, the company file will contain
a recorded statement of the policyholder and/or the claimant as well as witnesses). For firstparty property claims, the Colorado Division of Insurance has promulgated a rule concerning
“Reasonable Investigation” that includes a list of sources that insurers may consult along with
a list of what records the insurers must keep in claim files. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-5:5-114(4)(B) (2020).
353 See, e.g., KEN BROWNLEE & PAT MAGARICK, CASUALTY, FIRE AND MARINE INVESTIGATION
CHECKLISTS § 9:1 (10th ed. 2019).
354 4 LAW & PRACTICE
updated June 2020).

OF INSURANCE

COVERAGE LITIGATION § 51:8, Westlaw (database

355 Answer to Complaint at 1, Mulholland v. Fernandez, No. 2015-CV30021 (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Feb. 25, 2015) (Adams Cnty.); Complaint at 1, Jones v. Flores, No. 2015CV31497 (Colo. Dist.
Ct. Apr. 28, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer Under Simplified Civil Procedure at 2, Walker v.
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Situations in which there existed no insurance claim files at the time of the filing
of the lawsuit are, therefore, exceedingly rare. There is no authoritative data—no data
at all, really—for how many filed car-crash lawsuits are the first news that a
defendant’s insurance company has of a crash. For the filing of the lawsuit to be the
first notice to the insurer, no one could have called the insurance company after the
crash—not its insured, the injured person or persons, nor the police—and not the
plaintiff’s lawyer once he or she undertook the representation.
In the sampled lawsuits, plenty of time elapsed between the crashes and the filing
of the lawsuits. The median number of days between the crash and the filing of the
complaint was 727 days or just over twenty-three months. The mean time to file the
complaint was 741 days, or just over two years.356 The shortest number of days from
crash to complaint was twenty-one days, but only four of the 298 complaints were
filed thirty days or fewer from the crash date. Plaintiffs’ attorneys do not rush to the
courthouse to file car crash cases.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed forty-four of the cases within one week of the three-year
statute of limitations, whether through their own procrastination, because the injured
persons waited a long time to find lawyers, or some other reason. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
filed another fifteen cases beyond the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations
for car crashes in Colorado, with the longest filed 2,393 days or 6.5 years after the
crash. Some of the late filed car crash complaints were uninsured motorist or
underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) cases in which the injured persons sued their own
insurance companies for benefits because the tortfeasor’s insurance was either
nonexistent or insufficient. Some late filed complaints may have been subject to
tolling agreements in which the parties agreed to delay the filing of the case, and with
some suits, perhaps the minority of the plaintiffs357—or another factor—tolled the
running of the statute of limitations.
Even the passage of many, many months from the crash to the filing of the
complaint did not lead to the insurance defense mill attorney admitting to knowing
facts that a reasonable investigation would have uncovered. For example, Sukey
Austin filed suit against his insurer, USAA, on June 12, 2015, for a crash that had
happened on August 1, 2009.358 His claim against USAA was for underinsured

Cook, No. 2015CV30021 (Colo Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015) (La Plata Cnty.); Answer Under
Simplified Civil Procedure at 1, Richards v. Shuler, No. 2015CV30540 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan. 21,
2016) (Denver Cnty.).
356 Because the crashes that led to litigation happened two years before the filing of the
litigation and because the state collects most data on an annual basis, the above analysis of
traffic volume and number of crashes looked at the 12-month period starting in July 2012
through June 2013.
357 Colorado law defines a “minor under eighteen years of age” as a “person under disability”
unless the minor has a “legal guardian.” COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-101(3) (2020). An injured
minor has three years or until his or her twentieth birthday, whichever is later, to file a car crash
complaint, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-103(1)(c) (2020), except that there is no tolling of the
statute if an injured minor at the time of the crash “is represented by a legal representative” such
as a guardian. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-81-103(1)(a) (2020).
358 Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, para. 7, Austin v. USAA Cas. Ins., No. 2015CV30489
(Colo. Dist. Ct. June 12, 2015) (Larimer Cnty.) [hereinafter Austin Complaint].

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6

52

2021]

FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES

837

motorist benefits because the tortfeasor’s Farmers Insurance policy limits of $100,000
were inadequate given his substantial injuries.359 Notwithstanding the passage of
nearly six years from the crash to when Timms Fowler, Esq., filed suit on behalf of
Mr. Austin; notwithstanding Mr. Fowler’s attachment of the traffic accident report as
an exhibit to the complaint; and notwithstanding that Mr. Fowler likely sent demand
letters and records to USAA attempting to settle the underinsured motorist claim;
USAA’s lawyer Deana Dagner, Esq., of Dagner, Schluter, Mitzner & Werber LLC,
claimed to be without sufficient information to answer thirty of the complaint’s fortythree allegations.360 Ms. Dagner claimed not to be able to answer whether Mr. Austin
lived “at all relevant times” in Larimer County nor that he now lived in El Paso
County.361 About the accident, Ms. Dagner claimed insufficient information to be able
to admit the date, time, or location of the accident; the name of the tortfeasor; the make
or year of her car; her license plate number; the direction she was driving; or where
she was headed.362 Ms. Dagner claimed not to be able to admit the color, year, and
make of the vehicle that the plaintiff drove notwithstanding the fact that USAA was
his insurer.363 The insurance defense mill lawyer also claimed insufficient information
to admit Mr. Fowler’s allegation that the other driver got a ticket, the number of the
ticket, and what part of the code she had allegedly violated. 364 Ms. Dagner refused to
admit that the other driver failed to yield the right of way to Mr. Austin. 365 Ms. Dagner
refused to admit that Mr. Austin was wearing his seat belt, a fact contained within the
Traffic Accident Report.366 Ms. Dagner refused to admit that the vehicle of USAA’s
insured was damaged or the dollar amount of the damage.367 USAA did admit that the
plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Fowler, gave notice to USAA of the possible UM/UIM claim
and received permission from USAA to settle the claim for the $100,000 limit of the
tortfeasor’s policy with Farmers Insurance.368 Notwithstanding these admissions,
359 Id. at 5, para. 39.
360 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 1–4; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para. 7.
361 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 4 (Ms. Dagner refers to para. 5 but means para.
4); Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para. 4.
362 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, paras. 7–8; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 1–2.
363 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 9; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para.
7.
364 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 10; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para.
10.
365 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 11; Austin Complaint supra note 358, at 2, para.
11.
366 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 2, para. 14; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 3, para.
14.
367 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 3, para. 19; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 2, para.
10.
368 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 4–5, paras. 35–36; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at
5, paras. 35–36.
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USAA’s lawyer denied knowing that the tortfeasor had settled with Mr. Austin, denied
knowing the date on the check and the date of its receipt, and denied knowing that Mr.
Austin “executed a General Release releasing [the driver] on July 19, 2013.”369
Facts that USAA’s attorney Ms. Dagner claimed not to know were within USAA’s
knowledge. In settling the claim with the underlying tortfeasor, the UM/UIM
provisions of the USAA insurance policy obliged the plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Fowler,
to keep USAA apprised of the steps in his negotiation and settlement with Farmers
Insurance.370 If USAA’s attorney, Ms. Dagner, disputed any of Mr. Fowler’s
allegations on behalf of his client Mr. Austin, then she should have denied them. But,
years after the crash and with a claim investigation file that had to be expansive, Ms.
Dagner’s claims not to have sufficient information simply cannot be true unless USAA
failed to provide her with its claim file due to USAA’s own bureaucratic
incompetence. Bureaucratic dysfunction is one possible reason explaining the inability
of defense lawyers to admit the most basic information that an insurer is obliged to
collect as part of a reasonable investigation. However, were the file missing or
incomplete, Ms. Dagner had plenty of time to collect that information herself after Mr.
Fowler filed his June 12, 2015, complaint. She did not answer until November 16,
2015, more than five months after Mr. Fowler filed the complaint. During that time,
USAA’s lawyer might have conducted a reasonable investigation that was consistent
with the insurance policy, Colorado law concerning unfair practices, and Rule 11. Her
research would have yielded not only the color, make, and year of Mr. Austin’s car
but would have resolved a slew of other facts Mr. Fowler alleged. For good measure,
Ms. Dagner also refused to answer four allegations that called, she said, for a
conclusion of law and, as noted above, she claimed that the USAA policy spoke for
itself.371 Ms. Dagner concluded her answer with a prayer for relief asking that USAA,
“having fully [sic] answered plaintiff’s Complaint and Jury Demand,” receive a
judgment on its behalf.372
Insurance defense mill attorneys have adequate time to answer complaints. Under
Colorado’s Rules, the defendant has twenty-one days to answer a complaint.373
However, plaintiffs’ lawyers routinely agree to allow additional time when a defense
attorney asks. And, if a plaintiff’s lawyer refuses to allow additional time to answer, a
judge could routinely grant additional time—and the uncooperative plaintiff’s lawyer
could expect some harsh words from the court.374

369 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 4, paras. 30–31; Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 4,
paras. 30–31.
370 Austin Complaint, supra note 358, at 4–5, paras. 29–39.
371 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 1, 4, paras. 1–3, 33.
372 Austin Answer, supra note 341, at 5–6.
373 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1) (“A defendant shall file his answer or other response
within 21 days after the service of the summons and complaint.”); accord FED. R. CIV. P.
12(a)(1)(A)(i) (“A defendant must serve an answer within 21 days after being served with the
summons and complaint . . . .”).
374 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(B).
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Defense attorneys answered just 10.7% or thirty-eight of the suits within twentyone days or fewer with eleven answers coming on day twenty-one. That is, only one
out of ten attorneys answered within the twenty-one day deadline of Rule 12. One
eager lawyer, Gregory Falls, Esq., answered on behalf of GEICO in an UM/UIM claim
on the very day that the plaintiff’s attorney, Meloney Perry, Esq., filed the lawsuit.375
Likely, Ms. Perry had shared a draft complaint with the defense attorney before filing,
as Mr. Falls was able to admit several facts including, for example, details regarding
the crash.376
Defense lawyers took longer than Rule 12’s twenty-one days to answer 89.3% of
the complaints. By four weeks after the filing of the complaint, defense lawyers had
answered another 14.6% of the complaints, bringing the total number answered to just
over one quarter of all complaints. During week five, they answered another 10.4%
and another 10.1% the week after. By the end of seven weeks, there were answers in
just over half of the lawsuits (53.5%). Overall, defendants’ lawyers filed their answers
an average of seventy-nine days after the filing of the complaint, although the
amendment and sometimes re-amendment of complaints and answers makes this
number a bit squishy. The median number of days to answer—also a squishy
number—is shorter, at forty-seven days, which is more than twice the number of days
the rule specifies.377 The longest time from the filing of the complaint to answering is
411 days, with this delay a function of actions of the attorneys for both the plaintiff
and defendant. Overall, having to answer within twenty-one days of the filing was not
a significant constraint.
In car crash cases, a claim file nearly always exists. Plaintiffs’ lawyers are unlikely
to file suit if there is no insurance. Lawyers know, long before filing, whether the
potential defendant has insurance. For starters, the Traffic Accident Report “speaks”
of the presence (or absence) of insurance. After signing a client, the plaintiff’s lawyer
will contact the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier and generally send a letter of
representation. If there is no coverage, then the plaintiff’s lawyer will usually explain
to the client that there is no point in proceeding.
On the other side, there is no excuse for the defense lawyer not reading the claim
file before answering in order to answer based upon the facts therein. The insurance
company need only share a digital copy of the file with the defense lawyer. The
insurance defense mill attorney should also speak with the insured, who is also known
as the client. The defense lawyer has contact information for the defendant—mobile
phone numbers, email addresses, and physical address—and the insured defendant has

375 Defendant GEICO Casualty Company’s Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 1, Gribble v.
GEICO Cas. Co., No. 2015CV30535 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2015) (Adams Cnty.), Filing ID
No. 7F8F7514D98F.
376 Id.
377 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1).
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a duty under the policy to cooperate in his or her own defense.378 Ethically, the
insurance defense mill lawyer is obliged to investigate before answering.379
Given the existence of insurance claim files and the routineness of car crash claims,
the twenty-one days that Rule 12 provides should be sufficient to answer. Indeed, if
Rule 12’s provision of three weeks to answer is unrealistic, then the Colorado Supreme
Court should revise the rule. When a defense attorney needs additional time, plaintiffs
will generally agree, knowing that judges freely grant motions to enlarge time to
answer.380
Even in the unimaginably rare situation in which no claim file existed at the time
of the filing of the lawsuit, the insurance companies would still have weeks during
which they could investigate the crash, injuries, and claim before the insurance defense
attorney would have to answer the complaint. Plaintiffs lawyers and, even more so,
judges would freely grant a defense lawyer’s motion to enlarge time in order to
investigate the claim before answering.381
Insurance defense attorneys can speak with the client and read the claim file
without ever leaving their desks. Personally, I also believe that they should leave their
desks and visit the crash site, as nothing substitutes for in-person viewing.
Why, then, is there so much evidence in the answers that the defense mill attorneys
have not read the claim file, have not spoken to the defendants, and have never visited
the scenes of the accidents? As with refusals to answer allegations that ask for a legal
conclusion, concern a codefendant, or refer to a document, insurance defense mill
lawyers’ practice is to delay by refusing to answer even when they could.
IV. FRIVOLOUS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
This Article has not yet cataloged the truly frivolous aspects of insurance defense
mill attorneys’ answers to complaints in car crash cases. Thus far, this Article has
looked at insurance defense mill attorneys’ responses to the allegations within
plaintiffs’ complaints. Defense attorneys ignore the clear pathway of Rule 8 and avoid
378 Some defendants, of course, do not assist with their own defense nor live up to their
obligations under the policy. See, e.g., Soicer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 351 P.3d 559,
565 (Colo. App. 2015) (“Colorado law recognizes that the right to recover under an insurance
policy may be forfeited when, in violation of a policy provision, the insured fails to cooperate
with the insurer in some material and substantial respect and the failure to cooperate causes
material and substantial disadvantage to the insurer.”).
379 COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 1.1 (“Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”); COLO. R.
PRO. CONDUCT 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client.”); COLO. R. PRO. CONDUCT 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law.”).
380 COLO. R. CIV. P. 12.
381 COLO. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (“When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of
court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause
shown may, at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice, order the period
enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed . .
. .”).
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answering by claiming they need not respond to an allegation that calls for—or
includes—a legal conclusion; that they can ignore allegations directed at another
defendant; and that various documents—statutes, traffic accident reports, tickets, and
insurance policies—speak for themselves. Notwithstanding the existence of claimsinvestigation files, the passage of considerable time from the crash to the filing of the
complaint, and generally, ample time to answer, defense attorneys also often claim
insufficient information to answer and do not reveal that they know much of anything
about their clients nor the crash. The defense attorneys’ responses depart from the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, which a judge once said to me are not the Colorado
Suggestions for Civil Procedure.382
The second part of the answer that defense attorneys file includes affirmative
defenses. An affirmative defense takes the form of “If so, so what?”383 This means that
the defense attorney claims that even if the defendant did what the plaintiff alleges, an
affirmative defense shields the defendant from liability.384 The statute of limitations
offers a simple example. A defense attorney could include an affirmative defense that
says, even if the defendant caused the car crash and injuries as the plaintiff alleges, the
crash was fifteen years ago, so the statute of limitations has run. If so, so what?385
Colorado’s Rule 8(c) authorizes the inclusion of affirmative defenses and
anticipates, at least implicitly, their inclusion after the defendant has answered the
complaint’s allegations.386 Section (c) of Rule 8 is titled “Affirmative Defenses and
Mitigating Circumstances.”387 Rule 8(c), like the federal rule,388 includes a
nonexhaustive list of affirmative defenses, which the rule notes, “a party shall set forth
affirmatively” when “pleading to a preceding pleading.”389 The affirmative defenses
relevant to torts include assumption of risk, contributory negligence, injury by fellow
servant, release, res judicata, statute of limitations, and a catchall for “any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”390 Of relevance when the insurance
defense mill lawyer wants to claim, for example, that that plaintiff did not receive

382 COLO. SUG. CIV. PRO.
383 I credit Dean Beto Juárez for this formulation. “Yes, but” is another version.
384 See Salinas v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. B-10-194, 2011 WL 13254062, at *2–4
(S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2011) (finding that some of a party's “affirmative defenses” were not true
affirmative defenses).
385 Russell, supra note 141, at Sections VI.D., VIII.D., IX.C.
386 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
387 Id.
388 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
389 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
390 Id.
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enough or any medical treatment, Rule 8(c) specifies that “[a]ny mitigating
circumstances to reduce the amount of damage shall be affirmatively pleaded.”391
Of the 356 answers in the sample, 350 included a separate list of defenses. Some
defense lawyers labeled their separate list as “affirmative defenses” and others simply
as “defenses.” Technically speaking, many of the listed items were not true affirmative
defenses in the “if so, so what?” form. The highest number of separate defenses was
twenty-eight. Including the six answers with no separate defenses, both the median
and average number of defenses for the car crash answers was nine. The standard
deviation was 4.6.
The list of nine “affirmative defenses” that Robert Jones, Esq., included in his
answer on behalf of Rhonda Mills is typical of the work of insurance defense mill
lawyers. On behalf of Nancy Severns, Amanda Francis, Esq., alleged that on January
11, 2012, Ms. Severns was a passenger in a car that Ms. Mills hit after running a stop
sign.392 After “answering” the complaint that Ms. Francis filed, Mr. Jones appended
the following list:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1.

That Plaintiff’s claims for damages against the Defendant are
barred, reduced or governed by the contributory negligence or
comparative fault of the driver of the automobile the Plaintiff was a
passenger in in accordance with the provisions set forth in C.R.S.
§13-21- 111, 111.5 and C.R.S. §13-50.5-101. et. seq.

2.

The alleged injuries and damages, if any, were proximately caused
by unforeseeable intervening acts of third parties over whom the
Defendant had neither control nor right of control.

3.

Defendant, without fault, faced a sudden emergency and acted
reasonably under the circumstances.

4.

Plaintiff’s failure to take such reasonable steps as would have
mitigated or minimized the alleged injuries and damages, which
includes but is not limited to failure of the Plaintiff, Nancy Severns
to utilize a safety belt system, precludes recovery on those injuries
and damages pursuant to C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7 [sic].

5.

The Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are barred or limited by the
provisions of C.R.S. § 13-21- 102.5 (limitations on damages for
non-economic loss or injury).

6.

Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred or reduced as such
damages were proximately caused by unrelated prior and/or
subsequent events for which the Defendant is not responsible.

391 Id. The rule also notes that “[w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat
the pleading as if there had been a proper designation.” Id.
392 Civil Complaint at 2, paras. 8, 10, Severns v. Mills, No. 2015CV30033 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Jan.
9, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.).
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The Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to
prosecute all or a portion of the claim in question.

8.

The Plaintiff’s recovery is barred or reduced by payment from a
collateral source pursuant to the provisions of C.R.S. §13-21-111.6.

9.

The Defendants respectfully reserves [sic] the right to amend this
Answer in the future to include additional affirmative defenses as
discovery reveals are appropriate. To the extent the law and/or facts
in this matter currently support any affirmative defense listed in
C.R.C.P. 8(c) not heretofore stated, and/or to the extent any facts or
law later discovered or enacted support any such defenses, such
defenses are hereby affirmatively plead.393

843

Mr. Jones’s list of “affirmative defenses” is what plaintiffs’ lawyers face after
filing complaints. The first item in the list is not an affirmative defense at all. The first
item simply refers to Colorado’s law on comparative fault,394 pro-rata liability of
defendants according to fault,395 and then refers to Colorado’s enactment of the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.396 Mr. Jones includes no facts
whatsoever with this “affirmative defense.” He does not, for example, include any
factual allegation that Ms. Severns was herself negligent. Therefore, this allegation
does not in any way put Ms. Severns or her attorney on notice that Mr. Jones will be
trying to prove comparative fault. The effect of the “affirmative defense” is nothing
more than to say that Colorado law regarding comparative fault and pro-rata
apportionment apply, but the law would apply regardless of whether he cites the
statutes. As for the reference to the Uniform Act—a particularly gnarly statute in my
view as a torts professor—the statute applies without Mr. Jones’s saying so but has no
application given there is but one defendant and therefore no need for contribution
among tortfeasors. In all, the first “affirmative defense” is at best a waste of words that
says that the law applies, though at worst, the “affirmative defense” might establish—
depending on the judge—that Mr. Jones has successfully put the plaintiff’s lawyer on
notice of a comparative fault defense without alleging any factual basis.
Other of the nine “affirmative defenses” in Mr. Jones’s list also do nothing more
than pointlessly refer to applicable law. For example, the fifth item in the list states
that “[t]he Plaintiff’s damages, if any, are barred or limited by the provisions of C.R.S.
§ 13-21-102.5 (limitations on damages for non-economic loss or injury).”397 With this
provision of the state’s statutes, the Colorado General Assembly capped damages for
noneconomic loss.398 In 2015, the cap for non-economic loss—pain and suffering or

393 Defendant Rhonda M. Mills’ Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2–3, Severns, No.
2015CV30033 [hereinafter Severns Answer].
394 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (2020).
395 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2020).
396 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-50.5-101 (2020).
397 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 5.
398 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(1) (2020).
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general damages—was $366,250, which could double with clear and convincing
evidence.399 Inclusion of the citation of the damages cap is not an affirmative defense,
and citation of the cap is neither necessary for the cap to be in effect nor useful in any
way.
Mr. Jones’s eighth item in his list of affirmative defenses is also pointless.400 Mr.
Jones cites Colorado’s amendment of the collateral source rule.401 Mr. Jones includes
no facts. Without the citation of the statute, the law would still apply. The first, fifth,
and eight “affirmative defenses” do nothing other than state that Colorado law applies.
With his second “affirmative defense,” Mr. Jones claims that “[t]he alleged injuries
and damages, if any, were proximately caused by unforeseeable intervening acts of
third parties over whom the Defendant had neither control nor right of control.”402
This, too, is not an affirmative defense but rather a suggestion of an attack on the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief. That is, Mr. Jones suggests with this “affirmative defense”
that someone else caused the harm, but he does not suggest who that might be. If,
indeed, his client Ms. Mills was not driving the car and did not run a stop sign and
crash into Ms. Severns, then the plaintiff (and the court) might reasonably expect to
hear that claim in the answer, which Mr. Jones filed more than six months after the
filing of the complaint and more than three and a half years after the crash. Indeed, if
any truth lay behind this allegation, then the plaintiff’s attorney would likely have
dumped the case long before filing. But, of course, no facts lay behind the boilerplate
language of this or other of Mr. Jones’s “affirmative defenses.”
Mr. Jones’s fourth “affirmative defense” misstates the law and also is fact-free.
Mr. Jones states that “Defendant, without fault, faced a sudden emergency and acted
reasonably under the circumstances.”403 Mr. Jones attempts to state what torts students
know as the sudden emergency doctrine. A sudden emergency is, however, not a
defense; a sudden emergency is a circumstance relevant to whether the defendant
exercised reasonable care under the circumstances.404 Moreover, the Colorado
Supreme Court had, in 2013, eliminated sudden emergency from the state’s pattern
jury instructions and abolished the doctrine.405 For the court, then-Justice and later
Chief Justice Nancy Rice wrote: “[w]e hold that Colorado negligence law no longer
requires the sudden emergency instruction and that the instruction’s potential to
399 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (2015), amended by COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21102.5(3)(c)(III) (2019) (increasing the limitations on general damages to $468,010, which may
be raised to a maximum of $936,030 on clear and convincing evidence); see COLO. SEC’Y OF
STATE, ADJUSTED LIMITATIONS FOR DAMAGES PURSUANT TO C.R.S. 13-21-102.5(3)(c)(III)
(2020),
https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/files/damages_new.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GPL-CXC9] (order of the Secretary of State increasing limitations on
general damages).
400 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 5.
401 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (2020).
402 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 2, para. 2.
403 Id. at 2, para. 3.
404 DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 190, at 50–52.
405 Bedor v. Johnson, 292 P.3d 924, 925 (Colo. 2013) (en banc).
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mislead the jury outweighs its minimal utility.”406 More than two years before Mr.
Jones filed his list of affirmative defenses, she had written: “[w]e therefore abolish the
sudden emergency doctrine.”407
Mr. Jones’s fourth “affirmative defense” is one of the two items in the list that
comes closest to being a true affirmative defense, and with this item, he swerves
closest to including a fact. The first part of the fourth defense is that “Plaintiff’s failure
to take such reasonable steps as would have mitigated or minimized the alleged
injuries and damages . . . precludes recovery on those injuries and damages pursuant
to C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7 [sic].”408 Mr. Jones tucks the second part of the defense,
commonly known as the seat belt defense, into the middle of the item as a
nonrestrictive clause set off by commas—“which includes but is not limited to failure
of the Plaintiff, Nancy Severns[,] to utilize a safety belt system”—and then returns to
cite only that part of Colorado’s title 42 that refers to seat belt nonuse.409 This
affirmative defense may have two parts, with the first being a general failure to
mitigate damages and the second a failure to avoid consequences by wearing a
seatbelt.410 To the extent that Mr. Jones intends to plead a failure to mitigate other than
with regard to seatbelt use, he has run afoul of Rule 8(c)’s specific requirement that
“[a]ny mitigating circumstances to reduce the amount of damage shall be affirmatively
pleaded.”411 His fact-free claim includes no circumstances. Regarding seat belts, for
the moment I will assume that he is alleging as fact that Ms. Severns failed to wear
her seatbelt while a passenger on the day of the crash, a datum to which the Traffic
Accident Report would speak. If Mr. Jones were to prove that Ms. Severns was not
wearing her seatbelt as the Motor Vehicle Code required, then the statutory section
that he cited provides that the evidence “shall be admissible to mitigate damages with
respect to any person who was involved in a motor vehicle accident and who seeks in
any subsequent litigation to recover damages for injuries resulting from the
accident.”412 Nonuse of a seatbelt can reduce recovery for pain and suffering but not
economic loss including damages for medical costs.413
Mr. Jones’s sixth “affirmative defense,” like his second, is not an affirmative
defense but instead is a vague attack on the plaintiff’s case-in-chief. The listed item is
that “Plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred or reduced as such damages were
proximately caused by unrelated prior and/or subsequent events for which the

406 Id. at 927.
407 Id.
408 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 4 (the second numerical 7 after citation to the
statute is a typographical error); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7) (2020).
409 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 4.
410 ROBERTSON ET AL., supra note 48, at 418. My former colleagues at The University of Texas
School of Law helpfully distinguish these concepts.
411 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
412 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(7) (2020).
413 Id.
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Defendant is not responsible.”414 Again, this fact-free language puts the plaintiff and
court on notice of nothing at all. If the matter were to go to trial, and Ms. Severns’
lawyer failed to prove that Ms. Mills caused her harm, then Mr. Jones could move at
the trial’s midpoint for a directed verdict. He could make that motion without having
included the sixth “affirmative defense” in his answer. His claim about unrelated
events is not an affirmative defense at all, plus he alleges no facts whatsoever to
support the claim. He does not, for example, allege that Ms. Severns was injured in a
prior car crash nor that after the car crash, she injured herself while snowboarding or
walking her dog.
The seventh item is also almost a bona fide affirmative defense albeit one that Mr.
Jones has pleaded without any factual support. The seventh item in the list is that “[t]he
Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to prosecute all or a portion
of the claim in question.”415 Like the federal rule, Colorado’s Rule 17 specifies that
“[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.”416 The
person injured when another driver runs a stop sign is the real party in interest, even
if there are various insurers who paid crash-related property or medical costs and may
themselves hold subrogation claims. Exactly how a defense attorney should raise the
claim that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest is unclear. The leading
commenter, Stephen A. Hess, notes:
Colorado rules do not explicitly designate the procedure for raising an
objection that the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. However, the cases
indicate, and the federal authorities confirm, that the challenge may be raised
either as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c) or in a pretrial motion under
Rule 12(b).417
Mr. Jones pleaded this claim without factual support, but this groundlessness is not
what makes this item only “almost” an affirmative defense. Mr. Jones uses the “may”
rather than “is.” This is perhaps an acknowledgment that no factual support can exist
for the claim.
Finally, Mr. Jones’s ninth claim (the eighth I addressed above as a mere statement
of existing Colorado law) is a weird catchall in three separate parts.418 The first
sentence is “The Defendant respectfully reserves the right to amend this Answer in the
future to include additional affirmative defenses as discovery reveals are
appropriate.”419 With this sentence, the insurance defense mill lawyer tries to expand
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure’s already liberal rules for amendment of
pleadings. Like its federal counterpart, Colorado Rule 15(a) allows for a party to

414 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 6.
415 Id. at 3, para. 7.
416 COLO. R. CIV. P. 17(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a).
417 STEPHEN A. HESS, HANDBOOK
updated Oct. 2020).

ON

CIVIL LITIGATION § 4:2 (2020), Westlaw (database

418 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 9.
419 Id. Reserving the right to add affirmative defenses has no legal effect. See Russell, supra
note 141, at 146.
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“amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is filed.”420 More important, the defendant may amend with permission of
the plaintiff or the court, with the rule specifying that “leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires.”421 Plaintiffs’ lawyers faced with requests for amendment should
ask the court to consider whether the claims-investigation file that existed at the time
the insurance defense mill attorney answered included facts that the defense attorney
might have included when making a list of affirmative defenses. If so, then justice
might not require that the judge permit amendment. Enforcing the provision for
amendment as written might encourage defense lawyers to incorporate facts into their
affirmative defenses. In any event, nothing about the Rules of Civil Procedure allows
the party to expand the scope of Rule 15 by simply saying so at the end of a list of
affirmative defenses.
The second sentence of Mr. Jones’s final “affirmative defense” is a bit of magical
realism that incorporates time travel. Mr. Jones writes that “[t]o the extent the law
and/or facts in this matter currently support any affirmative defense listed in C.R.C.P.
8(c) not heretofore stated, and/or to the extent any facts or law later discovered or
enacted support any such defenses, such defenses are hereby affirmatively plead.”422
The first long clause remarkably claims that Mr. Jones pleads as an affirmative defense
any of the defenses that Rule 8(c) lists if at the time he answers, there exist facts or
law in support of such defense. If effective, this would be an awesome way for the
defense attorney to avoid doing any investigation, research, or reading of the
investigation file. She or he could simply say that I have already pleaded all defenses
that existing facts or law support, even though I have no idea what those facts or law
are and, therefore, the plaintiff’s attorney and plaintiff cannot possibly have any idea
whatsoever, either. Carrying this magic into the future, Mr. Jones adds that when he
later discovers facts (perhaps by actually reading the claim-investigation file?) or
uncovers law or the legislature passes new law, then those facts and law will coalesce
into new affirmative defenses that he has already pleaded and that may, perhaps,
magically appear in his pleadings without having to resort to Rule 15 amendment.
I understand the second part of the last item in Mr. Jones’s list of “affirmative
defenses” in several ways. Most importantly, my opinion is that an insurance defense
mill attorney who uses this type of language is implicitly admitting to having failed to
read the claim-investigation file, investigate the claim himself or herself, research the
law, and speak with the client. Knowing of these professional and ethical failures, the
attorney nonetheless wishes to establish the affirmative defenses his or her client
would be entitled to make had the attorney acted ethically and professionally. Second,
I see these claims roughly like middle school children reserving cafeteria tables with
their backpacks on the way into the lunchroom or like Bostonians claiming a property

420 COLO. R. CIV. P. 15(a); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a).
421 COLO. R. CIV. P. 15(a). Compare id., with FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (allowing, under subsection
(1) amendment as a matter of course within 21 days and in other circumstances, while
subsection (2) notes that “[i]n all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the
opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when
justice so requires.”).
422 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3, para. 9.
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right by placing chairs in parking spaces they have shoveled.423 Neither the middle
schoolers nor the Bostonians are making actual legal claims, although they do
generally get what they want.
No one should be surprised that lawyers reuse parts of pleadings and motions. For
the sake of efficiency and also for the sake of making some money, lawyers adapt
previous work-product to new clients. From the biggest Wall Street firms to solo
practitioners in small towns, all lawyers do this. Oddly, Professor Engstrom seems
offended when lawyers operate efficiently.424
There is, however, a difference between adapting the work done for a previous
client and simply cutting and pasting. Like other insurance defense mill lawyers, Mr.
Jones simply cut and pasted his list of affirmative defenses—including a typographical
error. Likely, a legal assistant or paralegal did the actual cutting and pasting. The list
of “affirmative defenses” that Mr. Jones included in his answer to the lawsuit against
State Farm insured Ms. Mills was, character-for-character identical to the one that he
had included in defending T. Jay Alvarado and his employer Service Master of
Colorado Springs.425 Every jot and tittle of the nine defenses listed above had appeared
in the answer that Jones had filed a few months earlier including the typographical
error in referring to “C.R.S. § 42-4-237(7) 7.” The final 7 in this string is a typo, as
subsection (7) has no subparts and, if it did, they would be lettered not numbered.426
The only difference between Mr. Jones’s two lists is with the fourth “affirmative
defense” regarding seat belts. In the April answer, this item refers to “the Plaintiffs,
Bobbie Jackson and Adam Jackson.”427 The June answer substitutes Nancy Severns
and remembers to make Plaintiffs singular.428 Again, whether Mr. Jones or nonlawyer
State Farm staff made these changes is presently unknown.
Cutting and pasting would be acceptable if insurance defense mills adapted each
affirmative defense to the facts of each complaint after reading the claim-investigation
file and interviewing the client. Rather than cutting and pasting, the defense attorneys
and their staffs might use templates. A template might say, for example, “the plaintiff
was comparatively at fault because [he or she] [insert facts concerning the Plaintiff’s
negligence].” Perhaps the plaintiff was talking on the phone, not driving in her lane,
failed to use his signal, or any other thing. A template that includes a list of affirmative
423 See PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM
EVERYDAY LIFE (1998). This book’s cover features a chair holding a shoveler’s property interest
in a Boston parking spot.
424 See Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, supra note 14, at 1493 (“At settlement mills, it is
assumed that claims will be straightforward. Standardized and routinized procedures are then
designed and employed in keeping with that assumption. Efficiency trumps process and
quality.”).
425 Defendants T. Jay Alvarado and Egeler Enterprises, Inc. DBA Service Master of Colorado
Springs’ Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3–4, Jackson v. Alvarado, No.
2015CV30810 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2015) (El Paso Cnty.), Filing ID No. 5A4FAF62A38B5
[hereinafter Jackson Answer].
426 COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-237(1)(a) (2020).
427 Jackson Answer, supra note 425, at 1.
428 Severns Answer, supra note 393, at 3.
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defenses and that prompts the insurance defense mill attorney to add facts would
satisfy the factual commands of Rules 11 and 8. Cutting and pasting without facts does
not.
Going through every insurance defense mill attorney’s list of defenses would be
tedious for this Article’s dear readers; imagine how infuriating the lists are for the
plaintiffs’ attorneys! Simply describing and analyzing one list takes pages. A motion
to strike or to flesh them out takes even more time and text.
Insurance defense mill attorneys working for GEICO employed an approach very
similar to that of Mr. Jones on behalf of the State Farm insureds. With an asterisk,
attorneys in the office of Elizabeth A. Kleger & Associates identify themselves as
“Employees of Government Employees Insurance Company.”429 Answers by firm
attorneys make clear that they share their laundry lists of affirmative defenses within
the firm even though each attorney may tailor the list somewhat. Thus, in an answer
that Kianna Jackson, Esq., filed on August 7, 2015, in response to an amended
complaint concerning a crash on January 25, 2015, Ms. Jackson included the following
list:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
1.

The failure to take such reasonable steps as would have mitigated or
minimized the alleged injuries and damages precludes recovery on
these injuries and damages.

2.

The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have existed before
the occurrence complained of and recovery therefore may be
precluded or diminished as required by law.

3.

The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have resulted from
injuries incurred after the occurrence complained of and recovery
therefore may be precluded or diminished as required by law.

4.

The alleged injuries and damages, if any, may have been
proximately caused by unforeseeable intervening acts of third
parties over whom the Defendant had no control nor right of control.

5.

The Plaintiff named herein may not be the real party in interest to
prosecute all or a portion of the claim in question.

6.

The Defendant’s liability, if any, is limited to that amount
represented by Defendant’s pro rata share of negligence for fault, if
any, producing the claimed injury or loss.

7.

The Plaintiff’s claims may be barred or limited by the collateral
source rule of C.R.S. §13-21-111.6.

8.

Per C.R.S. § 13-21-111.5(3)(b), Defendant designates the driver of
Plaintiffs’ vehicle, Mr. Louis Daniel, as a negligent non-party.

429 Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Salazar v. MacNaughton, No. 2015CV31851
(Colo. Dist. Ct. June 22, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Salazar Answer]; Answer to
Complaint and Jury Demand at 1, Crayton v. Zachary, No. 2105CV32342 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug.
7, 2015) (Denver Cnty.) [hereinafter Crayton Answer].
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The Defendant respectfully requests the right to amend this Answer
in the future to include additional affirmative defenses as discovery
reveals are apparent.430

As with Mr. Jones’s list, there are no facts to support these “affirmative defenses”
and, in my opinion, no indication, apart perhaps from the attempt to designate a
nonparty, that Ms. Jackson had read the claim file nor interviewed her client before
answering. Like Mr. Jones’s list, few of the items are true affirmative defenses, several
suggest possible attacks on the plaintiff’s case-in-chief, and others pointlessly refer to
existing Colorado law. Like Mr. Jones, Ms. Jackson uses the final item in the list to
“respectfully request the right to amend” the answer, although, as noted above, Rule
15 liberally allows amendment and sets out a procedure.431 With the eighth item, Ms.
Jackson tried to designate the driver of the plaintiff’s car as a nonparty, which is
neither an affirmative defense nor quite the right way to designate a nonparty.432
Skye McCulloch, Esq., a colleague of Ms. Jackson’s at Elizabeth A. Kleger &
Associates, cut and pasted from the same source as Ms. Jackson. Ms. McCulloch filed
an answer on June 22, 2015, for a crash that happened on August 8, 2013.433 Ms.
McCulloch’s first item in her list of “affirmative defenses” was, character-forcharacter identical to the first item in the list that Ms. Jackson would file in her August
answer.434 Five other of Ms. McCulloch’s items differed from Ms. Jackson’s items by
just a single word. Three of Ms. McCulloch’s were distinct but still pointless—one
purported to raise the seatbelt defense, another stated the cap on non-economic loss,
and a third stated, of course without facts, that the defendant might be entitled to setoff.435 Again, there is nothing wrong with cutting and pasting for the sake of efficiency
within a firm, but, in my opinion, there is everything wrong professionally and
ethically with listing items as affirmative defenses that have no factual predicate and
that suggest or reveal that the attorney has failed to investigate.
The single word that distinguished the Ms. Jackson and Ms. McCulloch’s answers
on behalf of GEICO and its insured was “may.” As with the Jones list, Ms. Jackson
included the word “may” in five of the nine items on her list—the plaintiff’s injuries
“may have existed before”; the damages “may have resulted from injuries incurred
after”; the injuries “may have been proximately caused by” unrelated third parties; and
the plaintiff “may not be the real party in interest.”436 As noted above, the use of
“may,” even if the attorneys included facts, turns these items into garbage. The
430 Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3.
431 Id. at 3, para. 9.
432 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (2020) (“The notice shall be given by filing a pleading
in the action designating such nonparty and setting forth such nonparty's name and last-known
address, or the best identification of such nonparty which is possible under the circumstances,
together with a brief statement of the basis for believing such nonparty to be at fault.”).
433 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 1.
434 Id. at 3; Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2.
435 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 3.
436 Crayton Answer, supra note 429, at 2.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/6

66

2021]

FRIVOLOUS DEFENSES

851

standard of proof in civil claims is a preponderance of evidence; “may” is always less
than a preponderance.
For GEICO, Ms. McCulloch, who used the word “may” only once, instead hedged
her list with a 148-word introduction. Nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes or creates a need for such an introduction. “The Rules of Civil Procedure
require every Defendant to plead potential Affirmative Defenses at the time the
Answer is filed,” Ms. McCulloch correctly wrote, “or risk a determination,” she
continued, that “the potential Affirmative Defenses are waived, even though no
disclosures have been exchanged, and no right of discovery exists, at the time the
Answer is filed.”437 As noted above, Rule 8(c) offers a nonexclusive list of affirmative
defenses, many of which apply specifically to personal injury cases, and states that
“[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth . . . any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”438 However, Ms. McCulloch’s
claim about waiver of affirmative defenses is a bit dramatic because of the leniency,
already described, of Rule 15 and also because, as Mr. Hess comments, Colorado
“courts have been reluctant to allow forfeiture of affirmative defenses where the
defendant tries to raise the defense through some other means and there is no prejudice
to the plaintiff. Consequently,” Mr. Hess continues, “several cases have allowed a
defendant to raise an affirmative defense in briefs on a motion for summary
judgment.”439 Furthermore, Ms. McCulloch’s complaint that she had to assert defenses
when answering rather than after conducting discovery rings hollow. She took twentyseven days to answer the complaint, and GEICO had 656 days from the date of the
crash to the filing of the complaint to investigate.440 The claim-investigation file surely
would have allowed her to plead at least a single fact in her list of affirmative defenses.
Instead, Ms. McCulloch moaned in the second sentence of her introduction, “the
following Affirmative Defenses are necessarily pled based only upon information and
belief.”441
Like other insurance defense mill attorneys, Ms. McCulloch attempted to enlarge
the Rules of Civil Procedure to her own benefit: “Defendant reserves the right,” she
proclaimed in the third sentence, “to seek leave to add, withdraw, and/or modify
Affirmative Defenses once disclosures are exchanged, discovery is received, or other
information is obtained.”442 Strangely, she also noted that, “[i]n identifying the
following as ‘Affirmative Defenses,’ Defendant does not imply the burden of proof or
of going forward with evidence has shifted, as that is a matter for Court

437 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3.
438 COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(c).
439 HESS, supra note 417, § 3:4 (citing Bebo Const. Co. v. Mattox & O'Brien, P.C., 990 P.2d
78 (Colo. 1999)); see, e.g., Cox v. Pearl Inv. Co., 450 P.2d 60, 61–62 (Colo. 1969); Drake v.
Tyner, 914 P.2d 519, 521–22 (Colo. App. 1996); Alien, Inc. v. Futterman, 924 P.2d 1063, 1068
(Colo. App. 1995).
440 Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 1.
441 Id. at 3.
442 Id.
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determination.”443 As defendant’s counsel, she would have the burden of proving
affirmative defenses that she asserted; that’s the idea!
With the final sentence of her introduction to her list of “affirmative defenses,”
Ms. McCulloch implicitly revealed, as other insurance defense mill lawyers also have,
that she understood she was violating the Rules of Civil Procedure. “Pursuant to Rule
11,” she promised, “any defense that is not supported by the evidence, upon
completion of discovery, will be withdrawn prior to the start of trial.”444 As I discuss
below, Rule 11 requires both an investigation and a factual basis for any defenses
before an insurance defense mill lawyer pleads those defenses.445 I understand Ms.
McCulloch’s promise to withdraw frivolous or groundless defenses “prior to the start
of trial” to be an admission that she violated Rule 11 with her answer. Ms. McCulloch
inserted the same introduction to affirmative defense in all but one of eleven of her
answers that are in the sample.446 In one answer, though, she or her paralegal inserted
the introduction, but neglected to cut and paste the list of affirmative defenses into the
answer.447

443 Id.
444 Id.
445 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
446 Ms. McCulloch filed 11 of the answers in the sample. On average, she answered 57 days
after the filing of the complaint. See, e.g., Salazar Answer, supra note 429, at 2–3; Answer to
Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Norwood v. Oetken, No. 2015CV32323M (Colo. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 11, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, McKenna v.
Rackliff, No. 2015CV30776 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.) [hereinafter
McKenna Answer]; Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Mays v. Hague, No.
2015CV30021E (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 15, 2015) (Jefferson Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and
Jury Demand at 2, Benavidez v. Meyers, No. 2015CV31427 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 11, 2015)
(Denver Cnty.); Defendant French’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 5, Carter v.
Marshall, No. 2015CV30517 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 2015) (Arapahoe Cnty.); Answer to
Complaint and Jury Demand at 3, Lucero v. Barry, No. 2015CV30245 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 14,
2015) (Denver Cnty.); Defendant Caitlin Butler’s Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 4,
Britain v. Butler, No. 2015CV30712 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 10, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to
Complaint and Jury Demand at 2, Turner v. Settle, No. 2015CV30670 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2,
2015) (El Paso Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury Demand at 4, Norris v. Ross, No.
2015CV30336 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 23, 2015) (Denver Cnty.); Answer to Complaint and Jury
Demand at 3, Cook-Heisser v. Winters, No. 2015CV30094 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2015)
Jefferson Cnty.).
447 McKenna Answer, supra note 446, at 2. Two other insurance defense mills, Senter,
Goldfarb & Rice, LLC, and Overturf McGath & Hull, P.C., used the identical introduction to
their own lists of affirmative defenses. See Answer and Jury Demand at 2, Sefcovic v. Riggan,
No. 2015CV30303 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 4, 2015) (Douglas Cnty.); Defendant Robert Graham’s
Answer & Jury Demand to Plaintiff’s Complaint at 6, Yankey v. Graham, No. 2015CV30013
(Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 19, 2015) (Arapahoe Cnty.). The exact mechanism by which this text
diffused among the insurance defense mills is unknown. Deana Dagner used a similar
introduction to her list of fact-free affirmative defenses. See Defendant Polunci’s Answer to
Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Magill v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 2015CV32019 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Nov. 23, 2015) (Denver Cnty.).
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As noted, defense lawyers asserted an average of nine different defenses in their
lists of “affirmative defenses.” Few were true affirmative defenses. In support of these
affirmative defenses, the attorneys pleaded almost no facts. The median number of
facts that attorneys pleaded in support of their entire list of affirmative defenses was
zero. Indeed, 196 of the 356 answers included no facts in their assertion of affirmative
defenses. That is, more than half the answers contained no facts whatsoever in support
of any of the items in the list of defenses. The greatest number of facts in any answer
was four; the mean was one half. Again, that is an average of one-half of a fact pleaded
in support of the entire list of affirmative defenses, not one-half of a fact for each
defense.
However, even the figure of one-half fact per list of defenses is misleadingly high.
When coding the answers, I counted the assertion of the seat belt defense as a fact. As
my subthesis is that defense attorneys do not plead facts, I interpreted the assertion of
the seat belt defense conservatively against my thesis. So, I counted as a fact the claim
that the plaintiff may not have been wearing a seat belt, whereas I did not count as a
fact the bald claim that the plaintiff was also—or may have been—at fault for no
specified reason. Of the 160 answers that included from one to four facts, 130 of those
asserted that the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt. As in other states, compliance
with the law that requires seat belts is quite high in Colorado with 80.7% of drivers
wearing their seat belts in 2012 and 82.1% in 2013.448 Without success, I attempted to
collect a subsample of Traffic Accident Reports for a number of the crashes in order
to see what the reports said about whether the plaintiff had been wearing a seat belt
and to determine whether crashes included an unrepresentative sample of seat belt
nonwearers. My conclusion is that the assertion of the seat belt defense is not truly the
assertion of a fact, rather, the defense attorney is simply taking a shot in the dark.
Excluding the assertion of the seat belt defense as a fact reduced the number of
answers that asserted any facts at all to thirty-five. That is, only in 9.8% of the answers
did the insurance defense mill attorneys marshal any fact at all in support of the entire
list of affirmative defenses they asserted. Scandalous! Thus reduced, the average
number of facts that defense attorneys pleaded in support of each list of affirmative
defenses was 0.14. Again, this is not 0.14 facts per affirmative defense; this is 0.14
facts per list of affirmative defenses. Shameful!
Colorado’s statutes provide for attorney fees “against any attorney or party who
has brought or defended a civil action, either in whole or in part, that the court
determines lacked substantial justification.”449 In 1977, the General Assembly claimed
to “recognize[] that courts of record of this state have become increasingly burdened
with litigation which is straining the judicial system and interfering with the effective
administration of civil justice.”450 The legislators responded “to this problem” with
“provisions for the recovery of attorney fees in courts of record when the bringing or
defense of an action, or part thereof (including any claim for exemplary damages), is
determined to have been substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or

448 COLO. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & COLO. STATE UNIV. INST. OF TRANSP. MGMT., 2013 STATE OF
COLORADO
STATEWIDE
SEATBELT
SURVEY
(2013),
https://www.codot.gov/library/surveys/2013cdotstatewide.pdf [https://perma.cc/534C-4T2T].
449 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(2) (2021).
450 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-101 (2016).
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substantially vexatious.”451 The terms of the statutory provisions apply equally to
plaintiffs and defendants.452 Even so, during the forty-three years since the General
Assembly took action against frivolous claims, one hears of “frivolous lawsuits” but
not of “frivolous defenses.”
The legislature directs that “[t]he court shall assess attorney fees if, upon the
motion of any party or the court itself, it finds that an attorney or party brought or
defended an action, or any part thereof, that lacked substantial justification.”453 The
statute further specified that “‘lacked substantial justification’ means substantially
frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious.”454 Subsequent
litigation has allowed Colorado courts to further refine the definitions of groundless
and frivolous. For example, a division of the Colorado Court of Appeals held that “[a]
claim is frivolous if the proponent can present no rational argument based on the
evidence or law in support of the claim. A claim is groundless if the allegations in the
complaint, while sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
are not supported by any credible evidence.”455 Groundlessness and frivolousness
overlap while differing slightly in some way that is unimportant to my argument.
Rule 11 bolsters the threat of an award of attorney fees. Colorado’s Rule 11
provides that, “[t]he signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he
has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, it is well grounded in fact.”456 In addition, the attorney, by
signing, certifies that the pleading is “warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation.”457 Of course, a complaint and an answer
are pleadings.458
Rule 11 requires that attorneys conduct “reasonable inquiry” and file only
pleadings that are “grounded in fact.” The rule provides for sanctions against those

451 Id.
452 Id.
453 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-17-102(4) (2021).
454 Id.
455 Remote Switch Sys., Inc. v. Delangis, 126 P.3d 269, 275 (Colo. App. 2005).
456 COLO. R. CIV. P. 11(a).
457 Id.
458 COLO. R. CIV. P. 7 specifies the following pleadings: complaint, answer, a reply to a
counterclaim, answer to a cross-claim, third-party complaint, third-party answer, “and there
may be a reply to an affirmative defense.” Of course, only a complaint and answer will exist in
all cases. The defendant pleading affirmative defenses allows the plaintiff to reply to those
affirmative defenses, which pushes back the at-issue date. See COLO. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1) (“A
case shall be deemed at issue when all parties have been served and all pleadings permitted by
[COLO. R. CIV. P.] 7.”). Lawyers often mistakenly refer to motions, responses, and other
documents outside Rule 7 as pleadings as if “pleading” were a generic term for any document
a lawyer files with the court.
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who violate the rule. Linked, the Colorado statute allows attorney fees against parties
who present substantially frivolous or substantially groundless defenses or claims.459
Any defense that lacks any factual support is groundless and frivolous.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article is about civil procedure, torts, insurance, litigation, and professional
ethics. This empirical study draws data from trial courts using car crash lawsuits filed
in the first six months of 2015. Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a total of 1,538 such suits
during this period, and I collected and analyzed 298 complaints and 356 answers. On
average, these crashes took place about two years before filing, during which time
drivers in Colorado drove 46,868 million VMT per year.460 This driving led to 103,687
crashes of which about one quarter, or 25,760, resulted in injury.461 Not quite one in
nine injury crashes (11.5%) led to the filing of a lawsuit.462 Altogether, personal injury
litigation amounts to just under five percent of all civil litigation in Colorado, with car
crash lawsuits comprising 60.2% of all personal injury lawsuits.463 Understanding torts
and personal injury litigation means investigating car crashes, which is not a sexy
topic.
Stanford Law School’s Professor Nora Freeman Engstrom has looked at the
claimant’s side of personal injury claiming in a series of terrific articles. This work
has looked instead at the defense and specifically at what I call—adapting Professor
Engstrom’s terminology—insurance defense mill lawyers. These are the lawyers right
at the heart of personal injury litigation who represent car crash defendants, who work
for or are paid for by insurance companies, and who file answers to the complaints of
personal injury lawyers—many of whom advertise on billboards or TV. Less noticed,
perhaps, is that the insurance companies also advertise everywhere.
This Article shows that the insurance defense mill lawyers engage in practices that
ought to surprise—shock, really—anyone who believes that lawyers ought to follow
the law. I show that when answering a complaint, insurance defense mill lawyers
habitually ignore the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite clear guidance from
Rule 8, insurance defense mill lawyers answer evasively by using specious claims that
the Rules do not support. They typically refuse to answer when they believe the
complaint asks about a legal conclusion. They do not answer allegations that concern
a codefendant or another person. Instead of answering allegations that concern
statutes, Traffic Accident Reports, insurance policies, or other documents, the
insurance defense mill lawyers claim that the documents speak for themselves. But
they don’t.

459 SHEILA K. HYATT & STEPHEN A. HESS, WEST’S COLORADO PRACTICE SERIES, CIVIL RULES
ANNOTATED R. 8 (5th ed. 2020) (“Litigants should familiarize themselves with both Rule 11
and with the Colorado legislation that governs the attorney's responsibility for insuring that the
litigation process is not abused.”).
460 See sources cited supra note 92.
461 See supra notes 102103 and accompanying text.
462 See supra text accompanying notes 126128.
463 See supra Table 1 and note 129.
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Insurance defense mill lawyers in my opinion often do not investigate before
answering, which violates both Rule 11 and the Rules of Professional Conduct. After
crashes, insurance companies investigate. Indeed, the insurers are obliged to do so. On
average, plaintiffs’ lawyers filed complaints two years after the crash. The Rules allow
defense attorneys twenty-one days to answer, but defense lawyers file only about one
in ten answers that quickly. Instead, the median number of weeks from the filing of
the complaint to the filing of an answer seems to be about seven, which, even in the
absence of a claim file, is plenty of time to investigate at least the basic facts of a car
crash.
The affirmative defenses that insurance defense mill lawyers file with their
answers are lists of groundless, frivolous defenses that lawyers or their paralegals cut
and paste into the answers. These lists of defenses violate the Rules of Civil Procedure,
Colorado statutes, and, in my opinion as a law professor and member of the bar, the
ethical requirements of the legal profession. I do not believe that we should dignify
systematic departures from the Rules of Civil Procedure with the term “professional,”
nor do I think that signing pleadings into which paralegals have cut and pasted laundry
lists of affirmative defenses is appropriate professional behavior. Practicing law in this
way fails to meet any conception of professionalism with which I am familiar.
Why do insurance defense lawyers practice law like this? I plan to explore this
issue in more detail after interviewing defense lawyers, their paralegals, and others in
much the same way that Professor Engstrom interviewed personal injury lawyers.
There are many explanations for the departure of defense lawyers from the rules of
pleading. One explanation about which I mostly have third-hand knowledge is that
insurance companies have increasingly put the squeeze on insurance defense firms by
reducing the amount they will pay to the lawyers who defend their insureds.
Competition for the business that auto insurance companies provide to defense
firms—especially to defense mills that, obviously, are not in-house—leads defense
lawyers to do less and less when answering. The Rules of Professional Conduct for
lawyers require that we stand up to clients whose demands push us to behave below
professional norms. At some point, when the client refuses to pay for what needs to
be done, lawyers with ethical standards have to turn down the work.
The simplest answer, though, for why insurance defense mill lawyers practice law
in this way is because they can get away with ignoring the rules and not investigating
before they answer. They are, of course, willing participants in the practices that I have
described in this Article. Defense lawyers ignore the Rules of Civil Procedure because
the plaintiffs’ bar allows them to do so. Although the legal profession relies on norms
of self-policing, litigation’s essence is adversarial. Plaintiffs’ lawyers rarely file
motions asking defense lawyers to provide better answers. In part, they do not file
motions challenging the normal practices of evasion and non-investigation because
those motions take an enormous amount of time. Simply describing a list of nine
affirmative defenses took many pages in this Article; more pages are necessary to add
the citations and to convince a judge to order the defense attorney to amend the answer.
A more important explanation for how insurance defense mill attorneys get away
with evading the law and the norms of the profession is that the plaintiffs’ bar’s
acquiescence regarding frivolous defenses is a kind of compromise that expresses the
symbiosis between the insurance industry and the plaintiffs’ bar. Professor Engstrom
has shown how plaintiff-side settlement mills work in tandem with insurance firms
and churn out small settlements of small cases in an efficient manner that may not
make all law professors greatly proud of the profession. The same kind of implicit
agreement not to be disruptive seems to support frivolous defenses.
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Of course, judges also condone departures from the rules. A rare few judges—only
Judge Shadur, really, and he has died—review answers sua sponte and force defense
lawyers to file answers that comport with the Rules of Civil Procedure.464 My
experience is that when asked by plaintiffs’ lawyers via motions to strike or motions
for more definite statements, few judges grant motions striking fact-free lists of
affirmative defenses and answers that evade by ignoring the rules. Why do judges do
this? Perhaps because the bad pleading is part of the culture, and judges tend not to
want to rock the boat. Other explanations for such judicial behavior include that the
judges are subject to bureaucratic pressure that causes them to believe—wrongly, I
think—that pre-trial motions that force the defense to present facts and confine their
responses within the rules will tend to prolong litigation. I think the opposite is true.
Another explanation is that judges’ unwillingness to force insurance defense lawyers
to plead within the rules may also reflect the judges’ own bias against personal injury
plaintiffs.
For car crash cases, which dominate personal injury litigation, the attorneys
answering complaints have plenty of time and resources that they should use to
comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
defense lawyers, their counterparts in the plaintiffs’ bar, judges, injured people, and
all the insureds should expect and receive no less.

464 See Russell, supra note 141.
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